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Jurisdictional Statement 
This court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code section 78A-4-103(2)(h). 
Introduction 
This appeal concerns the district court's division of property and award of 
alimony in a divorce. The district court imputed assets and income to the 
husband before dividing the estate and awarded alimony in an amount that does 
not allow the husband to make the minimum payments to service his debt. 
The parties, Paul Rayner and Tanja Rayner, married in 1981, separated in 
2010, and were divorced in March 2012. Paul stopped working in April 2008 and 
the Rayners and their adult children lived off the family's stock investments. 
The trial court imputed income to Paul retroactively, concluding that he 
should have worked rather than living off investments before separation. The 
court determined that Paul "dissipated" all the n1oney that was spent but could 
not be accounted for frmn April 2008 to July 2010, long before their 2012 divorce. 
The court determined that Paul owed Tanja the money that he might have 
earned had he taken another job and the money that was spent before separation. 
Additionally, when fixing alimony, the district court assigned Paul his 
"own" debt-nearly $50,000 in unsecured debt accrued during the marriage-
but allowed him only $250 in his budget to make the $1,550 minimum payments. 
The court stated it was more important for Paul to take care of his wife than his 
debt and that "there were some other things he could do about that." 
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Statement of the Issues 
Issue 1: Whether the dish·ict court erred when it valued and divided the 
marital estate unequally, after determining that Paul II dissipated" assets that in 
fact he never earned, and that he "dissipated" assets that in fact were spent in the 
two-to-three year period before separation, even without a finding that Paul 
acted obsh·uctively. 
Standard of Review: This court reviews a trial court's determination that 
one spouse dissipated 1narital assets for abuse of discretion. Goggin v. Goggin 
(Goggin II), 2013 UT 16, if16, 299 P.3d 1079. However, an error of law is an abuse 
of discretion. Goggin v. Goggin (Goggin I), 2011 UT 76, if 26, 267 P.3d 885. 
Preservation: This issue is preserved. (R.221,243,254-257D.) To the extent 
the issue is not preserved, this court should review for plain error. An 
unpreserved issue may be addressed on appeal under the plain error doctrine, 
State v. Weaver, 2005 UT 49, if 18, 122 P.3d 566. Claims for plain error require 
obvious, prejudicial error. State v. Lomu, 2014 UT App 42, if 6,321 P.3d 235. 
Issue 2: Whether the district court abused its discretion when it calculated 
Paul's alimony obligations by assigning him all of his "own" debt, which had a 
1ninimum monthly payment of $1,550 while simultaneously reducing his ability 
to make those payments to only $250, the result of which is an alimony 
obligation that he cannot actually satisfy, and which does not" equalize the 
poverty" between the parties. 
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Standard of Review: This court reviews a dish·ict court's award of 
alimony for abuse of discretion. Bakanowski v. Bakanowski, 2003 UT App 357, ~7, 
80 P.3d 153. 
Preservation: This issue is preserved. (R.213-14,244,260-61.) To the extent 
the issue is not preserved, this court should review for plain error. An 
unpreserved issue may be addressed on appeal under the plain error doctrine, 
State v. Weaver, 2005 UT 49, ~18, 122 P.3d 566. Clailns for plai11. error require 
obvious, prejudicial error. State v. Lomu, 2014 UT App 42, ~6, 321 P.3d 235. 
Determinative Provisions 
The followil1.g provisions are set forth at Addendum E: 
Utah Code§ 30-3-5 (alimony statute) 
Utah Code§ 78B-12-203(7) (imputation statute) 
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Statement of the Case 
1. Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings 
This divorce case concerns the division of the 1narital estate and alimony. 
The parties married in 1981, separated in July 2010, and were divorced on March 
20, 2012. Paul appealed certain components of that decision to this court. 
In November 2013, this court issued Rayner v. Rayner (Rayner I), 2013 UT 
App 269,316 P.3d 455. This court did not rule on the merits, but remanded the 
case to the h·ial court for further findings. The trial court ordered supplemental 
briefing on certain issues and entered its Supplen1ental and Amended Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law on October 10, 2014. Those findings modify but 
do not substantively change the outcome. On January 26, 2015, the district court 
entered its Amended Decree of Divorce and Final Judgment. Paul appeals the 
1nerits of the h·ial court's Supplemental and Amended Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and Amended Decree of Divorce. 
2. Background 
Paul and Tanja married in 1981. (R.1.) They have two children, who are 
now adults. (R.2.) Paul is gay. (R.209,246,148:67-68.) Tanja is schizophrenic. 
(R.148:14.) The parties "ended [their] marital relationship" in approximately 1986 
but stayed together to raise the children. (R.148:62.) They lived separately in their 
home in Bountiful, Utah. (R.209.) They started divorce proceedings in 2004, but 
those proceedings did not result in a divorce. (R.148:62;210.) These divorce 
proceedings began in 2010. (R.1.) 
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In 1989, Paul earned a master's degree in computer science. (R.Pet.Ex.17.) 
For many years, Paul worked for the LDS Church as a database designer in the 
family history department. (R.148:55.) In 1998, he began working as an instructor 
for the database company Oracle. (R.148:16,55;149:38.) He worked in "a very 
specific area called data warehousing, which is a very specific part of a very 
specific subset." (R.148:55.) In his words, "I was exh·emely skilled in an 
extremely small section of the computer industry." (R.148:55.) 
The Oracle job required extensive travel. (R.148:16,54.) Paul flew around 
the United States and Canada to teach people about Oracle's product. (R.148:54.) 
In a typical week, Paul would leave Salt Lake on a Sunday afternoon and fly to 
the week's work location. (R.148:79.) He would teach an Oracle class Monday 
through Friday, 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. (R.148:79.) He would return to Salt Lake on 
Saturday and fly out again on Sunday. (R.149:48.) 
In approximately 2001, Paul was infected with HIV. (R.148:77.) By 
approximately 2006, the disease had developed into AIDS. (R.148:73-74,77.) To 
manage the disease, he takes an "HIV cocktail," which includes the drugs 
kaleh·a, viread and epivir. (R.148:76.) Paul experienced frequent and severe 
diarrhea as a side effect of the viread. (R.148:78.) Paul found this side effect to be 
extremely problematic when he was traveling and teaching for Oracle seven days 
a week. (R.148:78-79;149:48.) 
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In 2005 or 2006, Paul developed Reiter's Syndr01ne. (R.148:77;149:7.) 
Reiter's Syndrome is a rare disease that attacks when the patient is overly 
exhausted. (R.149:5-6.) vVhen he first experienced the disease, he went to the 
hospital and, over the course of a week, every joint became inflan1ed and he 
temporarily lost the ability to walk. (R.149:6.) Now, it flares up when Paul 
becomes overly tired. (R.149:7.) To recover, he slows down, sleeps, and "get[s] a 
little lazier." (R.149:7.) 
Paul also suffers from neuropathy. (R.149:7.) He has no feeling in his feet. 
(R.149:7.) Since 2009, he has had problems with his left hand. (R.149:61.) It is 
"probably paralyzed," and likely to get worse. (R.148:57.) In June 2011, he had 
surgery on his hand to decompress a nerve that was "squished" between the 
elbow bone and the muscle. (R.149:8.) The surgery did not i1nprove matters. 
(R.149:8.) The neuropathy renders him unable to type with his left hand and has 
significantly affected his marketability. (R.149:9,10.) He testified at trial that 
"[i]t' s impossible to den1onstrate computer skills just by lecture alone. You need 
to show people how - you can't describe computer aspects of the database 
especially without actually going into the database and showing. A lot of those 
functions require two hands." (R.148:58.) 
Additionally, he suffers from hypogonadism. (R.149:11.) 
These health problems left him incapable of performing well at Oracle. 
(R.148:56,149:12.) He received a warning letter in March 2008 (R.Pet.Ex.13) and 
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was terminated in April 2008. (R.148:78-79.) As Paul described it, "[m]y health 
was deteriorating over the last couple of years [before 2008], which is why they 
[Oracle] terminated me, basically. I just couldn't meet their performance 
expectations, and they will admit that they are a very aggressive company when 
it c01nes to --- they said the average life expectancy of an Oracle employee is five 
years, and I worked there 10. Many of my colleagues were let go at five, so I did 
quite well." (R.148:56.) 
As far as maintaining his computer skills, he explained "[t]he only reason I 
would want to do that is if I was going to continue that high stress kind of work, 
which according to my doctor is not suitable for me and my health. So I was 
looking for something less stressful. I was trying to have a different lifestyle, 
which my wife totally didn't want to do, and so I had to do that by myself .... I 
can't afford from the cost of my health to do that kind of job that pays that kind 
of money anymore." (R.148:67-68.) 
In February 2008, Paul met his now-parh1er, Rich Mathis. (R.148:44.) At the 
time, Mathis lived in New Castle, Delaware. (R.148:43-44.) After Paul was 
terminated from Oracle, he and Mathis started two businesses together in two 
multi-level marketing companies. (R.148:45;149:68.) Eventually they decided to 
focus their energies on Melaleuca. (R.148:46-48.) They are still engaged with 
Melaleuca, although it has not yet proved to be very profitable. (R.148:70.) 
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Paul investigated other employment opportunities. (R.148:53;149:63-64.) 
Within a week of being terminated from Oracle, he was offered a job in Juab 
County School District. (R.148:53.) The school district wanted someone to design 
a small database. (R.148:72.) They offered approximately $40,000/year. (R.148:71-
72.) However, Tanja refused to relocate from Bountiful, and Paul believed that it 
was not econmnically feasible for him to relocate without her or to commute 
from Bountiful to Juab County. (R.148:53,72.) He also believed that once he 
designed the database, he would "have made [him]self out of a job." (R.148:72.) 
He did not take the job. (R.148:72.) 
He considered teaching at the University of Utah but it was not hiring at 
the time. (R.148:56;149:64.) He has not sought a part-time lecturing position 
because his hand is paralyzed and that renders it all but ilnpossible to give 
lectures on how to use a computer. (R.148:57.) 
During the 2008-2010 period, the Rayners made significant expenditures 
on behalf of their children who were, at that time, young adults. (R.149:46-47.) In 
July 2008, they bought their daughter a new car. (R.148:66;149:98.) They also gave 
their daughter $13,000 as a deposit on a house, which she has now repaid, and 
paid $1,800 for her electrical hook-ups. (R.148:65-67;149:47.) They paid their son's 
college tuition (R.148:65;149:47) and signed on a student loan for their daughter. 
(R.149:54-55.) They helped pay for their son's wedding and honeymoon. 
(R.149:47,52.) 
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The Rayners had significant investments in Oracle stock. (R.148:59;149:28.) 
They began liquidating those investments. Between April 2008 and July 2010, the 
Rayners liquidated approximately $300,000 of stock: $105,223 in 2008; $118,846 in 
2009; and $65,840 in 2010. (R.148:64-65;114-15.) Paul testified that they liquidated 
the stock on a n1onthly basis as needed. (R.148:65.) 
Paul testified that, to slow the spending, he suggested the family cut back 
on their spending, but they never did. (R.148:66.) Paul advocated selling the 
family home in Bountiful which, in his view, was more expensive than they 
could afford. (R.149:16,84-86,99.) Tanja refused. (R.149:16,84-86,99.) Paul 
continued to pay the mortgage on the house until July 2010, when he "ran out" 
of money. (R.148:60;149:55,85.) He and Mathis worked in the yard that summer 
in the hopes of selling the house. (R.149:48-49.) In November 2010, foreclosure 
proceedings were initiated. (R.148:22.) 
At that time, Tanja' s sister paid off the first mortgage and brought the 
second mortgage current. (R.34,111.) Tanja conveyed her interest in the house to 
her sister by Special Warranty Deed, (R.111,Pet.Ex.4), but Tanja continues to live 
there. (R.149:99.) She indicated that even now she refuses to sell it because her 
attorney told her that "according to the law, I'm entitled to live as accustomed as 
I've been living." (R.148:33;149:99,101.) 
Paul traveled frequently _during the period April 2008 - July 2010. 
(R.149:73-74.) Using the frequent flyer miles he accumulated while working for 
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Oracle, he traveled around the counh-y visiting friends and h-ying to make his 
Melaleuca business profitable. (R.149:73-74.) In January 2010, Paul stopped living 
in. the Bountiful home. (R.148:34.) He lived in Delaware with Mathis for a period 
of ti.me. (R.148:43-44.) In July 2010, Paul left the 1narital home permanently, and 
Tanja asked him not to come back. (R.149:39,68;148:34.)1 Mathis moved to 
Layton, Utah, and Paul began living with him. (R.148:34.) At tl1at ti.n1e, Paul 
stopped paying the mortgage on the Bountiful ho1ne. (R.148:34.) 
Tanja also suffers from certain disabilities. She has schizophrenia and 
panic attacks. (R.148:14-15.) She taught school for 16 years, but stopped in 1998. 
(R.148:12,14-15.) Since then, she has received Social Security disability payments. 
(R:148.27-28.) Paul first observed symptoms in his wife when they had been 
n1arried only a few months. (R.149:81.) Over the years, she has spent many 
1nonths in the hospital for her condition. (R.148:14;149:82.) The panic attacks 
occur randomly and are difficult to regulate. (R.148:15.) To alleviate them, she 
takes medication and watches TV. (R.148:15.) 
At the time of h·ial, the marital estate included approximately $50,896 in 
equity in the house (R.112;115); $10,807 in a retirement account of Tanja's (R.57); 
$30,514 in a retirement account of Paul's (R.Pet.Ex.10); and less than $1,000 in 
1 In Rayner I, this court indicated that the parties separated in January 2010. 
Rayner v . Rayner, 2013 UT App 269, ,r2, 316 P.3d 455. Although the parties drifted 
apart during 2010, and Paul spent significant amounts of ti.me between January 
and July with Mathis in Delaware, it is more accurate to say they "separated" in 
July 2010, which is the montl1 that Paul stopped supporting Tanja. (R.113.) 
10 • 
combined liquid assets (R.36,99,112,257B.) The parties had unsecured debts, 
including credit card debt, their daughter's student-loan debt, and back-due 
federal and state taxes, totaling $58,359.58. (R.102.) 
2.1 The trial court's initial decision regarding dissipation 
The trial court fixed $88,047 as the family's legitimate expenses because 
that was an average of Paul's salary during the years 2003 to 2007. (R.113-14.) 
The trial court also determined that Paul dissipated $172,095. (R.257B.) The trial 
court's initial decision was based on the following calculations, which were re-
entered on remand. (R.113-15;254-56.) It is important to remember that the 
parties did not separate until July 2010 and were not divorced until March 2012. 
2008: In 2008, while the parties were still living together, Paul earned 
$62,307 before he left his job in April 2008. (R.114;255A.) The trial court 
subtracted $88,047 from $62,307 and decided the Rayners had a "shortfall" of 
$25,740 in 2008. (R.114;255A.) Then, the trial court considered that Paul 
liquidated $105,223 of his stock, which is $79,483 greater than the "shortfall." 
(R.114;255A.) The court concluded that in 2008 Paul failed to earn and/ or must 
have spent - "dissipated" - $79,483. (R.114;255A.) 
2009: In 2009, while the parties were still living together, Paul did not earn 
income. (R.114;255A.) The trial court determined that Paul should have made 
$40,000 a year, but the family would still have required $88,047 in expenses, so 
there would have been a "shortfall" that year of $48,047. (R.114;255A.) Paul 
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liquidated $118,846 that year, which is $70,799 greater than the "shortfall." 
(R.114;255A.) The court concluded that in 2009, Paul failed to earn and/ or must 
have spent - "dissipated" -$70,799. (R.114;255A.) 
2010: The parties separated in 2010 and Paul supported Tanja and paid the 
mortgage through July 2010. (R.115;255A.) The court multiplied $88,047 by 7 /12, 
and also $40,000 by 7 /12, and determined that there was a shortfall in 2010 of 
$28,027. (R.115;256.) Paul liquidated $65,840 that year, which is $37,813 greater 
than the "shortfall." (R.115;256.) The court concluded that in 2010, Paul failed to 
earnand/or1nusthavespent - "dissipated" - $37,813. (R.115;256.) 
The trial court also determined that, over the course of thirty-one months 
during the marriage, between January 2008 and August 2010, Paul spent 
$39,034.16 on six items that "were not used for legitimate marital purposes." 
(R.258.) That number included $19,743.51 in Melaleuca products and services; 
$14,077.97 in h·avel expenses; $3,215.68 on adult entertainment; $1,100 given to 
Rich Mathis; $498 for legal services; and $399 for himself, his daughter, and 
Mathis to go the Cedar Point amusement park in Sandusky, Ohio. (R.258;149:36.) 
The court held that those expenditures "are illustrative" of other expenditures 
Paul must have made, but gave no explanation. (R.258.) 
Adding all those numbers together, the court concluded that Paul failed to 
earn and/ or must have spent $188,095 during a two-year, seven-month part of 
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their marriage. (R.257.)2 The court allowed that the parties had spent $16,000 on 
their daughter's car, which left an outstanding amount of $172,095. (R.257B.) The 
trial court determined that Paul owed Tanja half of that, plus half of his 
remaining retirement. (Id.) 
The findings of fact described above are summarized in this table: 
2008 2009 Jan- July 
2010 
Earned Income 62307 0 0 
Trial Court's Finding of Imputed Income 0 40000 23333 
Income from sale of stock 105223 118846 65840 
Allowable family expenses (88047) (88047) (51360) 
Difference (" dissipated") (79483) (70799) (37813) 
2.2 The trial court's initial decision regarding alimony 
As to alimony, the parties' financial declarations demonstrated the 
following. Tanja indicated that she had $1,085.00 in net monthly Social Security 
Disability Income (R.33-34) and $2,585 in monthly expenses (R.38,41.) The court 
reduced her monthly expenses by $542.50, leaving her "reasonable monthly 
expenses" of $2,042.50, and a remaining monthly need of $960. (R.116.) 
Paul indicated that he has $138.70 in monthly income from Melaleuca 
(R.98) and monthly expenses of $3,677.00, including $1,550 on monthly 
installment payments (R.101-02;116-17.) The tr·ial court found the $1,550 number 
"not reasonable," and instead allowed him only $250 to make his installment 
2 In the initial findings of fact, the trial court mis-added its own numbers, 
resulting in a total of $116,096. (R.115.) On remand, the trial court re-added and 
came up with the higher number, which is at issue in this appeal. (R.256 n.l.) 
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payments. (R.117.) The trial court reduced his other expenses by $329. (R.117.) 
The trial court then subh·acted and determined his "reasonable monthly 
expenses" were $1,948. (R.117.) In fact, that math contains an error: Paul's 
reasonable monthly expenses were ($3,677 - $1,300 - $177 - $152) = $2,048. 
The trial court imputed him income of $40,000 per year, which, after taxes, 
is $2,666 per month. (R.116.) Subh·acting the "reasonable monthly expenses" 
fron1 the iJ.nputed incon1e left Paul a surplus of $718. (R.117.) The trial court 
ordered Paul to pay Tanja $700 per 1nonth. (R.117.) 
2.3 This court's prior decision and remand 
Paul appealed to this court. (R.159-72.) This court determined that the trial 
court's factual findings were inadequate to support its conclusions and 
remanded. (R.172.) On remand, the h·ial court ordered the parties to provide 
supple1nental briefing as to the imputation and dissipation ele1nents. (R.179-80.) 
Paul objected to the order, but complied. (R.182-89,198-205,208-15,235-46.) Tanja 
responded (R.218-27.) No hearing was held. The trial court issued supplemental 
and amended findings of fact in October 2014, (R.249-257E) and an amended 
decree of divorce in January 2015. (R.296-99.) Paul appeals from that ruling. 
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Summary of the Argument 
The trial court divided assets the spouses did not have and awarded 
alimony one spouse could not possibly pay. Instead of dividing marital assets 
and liabilities at the time of divorce, the district court divided the assets they had 
in April 2008, when Paul was terminated from his job due to deteriorating health. 
Both Paul and Tanja, as well as their children, used 1narital assets from April 
2008 until the rune of separation in 2010, and therefore those assets did not exist 
at the time of divorce. The district court nonetheless attributed to Paul the assets 
the couple had as of April 2008, leading to a rather unfair division of property. 
This property division 1nisconstrues the meaning of" dissipation" in two 
ways. First, no Utah case has awarded a spouse retroactively-imputed income as 
part of a property distribution. Imputation is appropriate only in forward-
looking child support and alimony calculations. No Utah case has awarded to a 
spouse income that the other spouse did not earn during the marriage, after 
holding that the spouse should have earned the income during the marriage. 
Further, no Utah court has awarded a spouse money that was spent during 
the marriage and no longer part of the marital estate. A court may divide money 
that was "dissipated," meaning money that one spouse spent after separation in 
an effort to act obstructively. But no Utah court has awarded a spouse money 
that was "dissipated" before separation, let alone without finding bad faith. 
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The trial court's decision here is unworkable, undesirable, and 
unsupported by Utah law: it allows one spouse to complain that the other spouse 
under-earned and over-spent during the marriage and requires that party to 
rein1burse the complaining spouse upon divorce. 
The trial court also erred when it calculated alin1ony. Ordinarily, a trial 
court determ:ines how much 111onthly income is available to the parties, what the 
parties' monthly needs are, and equitably distributes any deficit. Here, the trial 
court assigned Paul to pay approximately $30,000 in credit card debt, $15,000 in 
student loans for their daughter, and $10,000 in back-due taxes, but did not allow 
him enough in his budget to make those payn1ents. 
The 1ninin1um monthly payments on those debts, set by the IRS, Utah State 
Tax Commission, student loan company, and credit card companies, were 
undisputedly $1,550. But the trial court determined that those minimum 1nonthly 
payments "are not reasonable." (R.116-17.) Instead, the court disregarded the 
actual monthly payn1ents and found "that a reasonable payment on installments 
is $250 .... [H]e has s01ne other things he could do about [his debts]. It is more 
important that he support his wife, than to take care of those other claims." 
(R.117.) The trial court did not specify what those "other things" were. The trial 
court therefore allowed him $250 in his budget to make his $1,550 minimum 
monthly payments and determined he could still afford to pay Tanja $700 per 
month in aliinony. This leaves Paul an enormous shortfall. 
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Argument 
Paul appeals the trial court's (1) division of marital assets and (2) award of 
alimony to Tanja. 
1. The trial court's division of marital assets errs because it incorrectly 
concluded that Paul dissipated assets 
Paul challenges the trial court's division of the marital estate. In short, the 
trial court erred in determining that Paul dissipated any assets, and even if he 
had, the trial court erred in looking at the dissipation of assets prior to the 
separation. The court should have divided the marital estate according to the 
customary formula, wherein each party is given half the estate. 
The Rayners married in 1981, separated in 2010, and were divorced in 
March 2012. But the h·ial court divided the estate as of April 2008, when Paul left 
his job. The trial court also divided income that was never earned and was never 
part of the marital estate: the trial court retroactively imputed income to Paul for 
the period April 2008 to July 2010, and then divided it. Both of these decisions 
are errors as a matter of law - and bad policy. 
No Utah case has divided a marital estate as of twenty-seven months 
before the parties separated based on the trial court's view of how the parties 
should have handled their finances. Nor would such a rule be wise: divorce 
courts do not, and should not, regulate the finances of married people or allow 
them, upon divorce, to complain that the other spouse over-spent or under-
earned during the marriage and ask the court to rectify the situation. 
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Moreover, no Utah case has divided assets that were never a part of the 
marital estate because they were never earned. Such a rule would be 
improvident; it would encourage litigation between divorcing spouses about 
whether they earned or spent more or less than they should. Because such 
litigation is unworkable and undesirable, Utah law allows only a division of 
assets that exist or recently existed, not assets that might have existed had things 
been different. 
As described below, the trial court erred in three ways in its understanding 
of the word II dissipate." First, the trial court erred as a matter of law because it 
incorrectly assumed that II dissipation" could refer to potential income that was 
never earned during a marriage. Second, the trial court erred as a matter of law 
because it incorrectly assumed that II dissipation" could refer to marital assets 
that were spent during the marriage, before the parties separated, without a 
finding that the spending party was acting obstructively. Third, even if a court 
could find that II dissipation" referred to marital assets that were spent before the 
parties separated, without a finding of obstruction, the court additionally erred 
as a matter of law because it improperly estimated the upper boundary of 
potentially dissipated assets without evidence to support the conclusion that 
Paul's behavior prevented the court from detennining how much was actually 
dissipated. 
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1.1 Customary procedure for dividing marital estates 
Before discussing the Rayners' case, it is helpful to review the customary 
procedure for dividing a marital estate. "Generally, each party is presumed to be 
entitled to all of his or her separate property and fifty percent of the marital 
property ... at the time of the divorce decree or trial." Goggin. v. Goggin. (Goggin. 
II), 2013 UT 16, ,r,r47,49, 299 P.3d 1079 (alterations 01nitted). Customarily, "[t]he 
value of marital property is determined as of the time of the divorce decree or trial. 
The reason for the rule is that by the very nature of a property division, the 
marital estate is evaluated according to what property exists at the time the 
marriage is terminated." Howell v. Howell, 806 P.2d 1209, 1211 (Utah Ct. App. 
1991) (emphasis added) (internal alteration, citation, and quotation marks 
omitted). 
But because Utah Code section 30-3-5(1) permits courts to issue equitable 
orders relating to marital property in divorce cases, the traditional procedure 
may occasionally be modified "where one party has dissipated an asset, hidden 
its value or otherwise acted obstructively." Goggin. II, 2013 UT 16, ,r49 (alterations 
and internal quotation marks omitted). To compensate one spouse for the other's 
dissipation, the court may "value a marital asset at some time other than the time 
the decree is entered, such as at separation., or may otherwise hold one party 
accountable to the other for the dissipation of marital assets." Id. (e1nphasis 
added) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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It appears that the first Utah appellate case allowin.g a trial court to divide 
the 1narital estate as of a date other than the date of divorce on the basis of 
dissipation was Peck v. Peck, 738 P.2d 1050, 1052 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). In Peck, the 
disputed asset was the husband's business. Id. at 1051. "At about the time the 
parties separated," the husband "closed all [his business's] corporate accounts 
and thereafter ceased all record keeping." Id. At h·ial, the husband asserted that 
during the period between separation and divorce, the business had dwindled 
fron1 as much as $1,000,000 to negative $50,400. Id. The trial court suspected that 
the husband "had failed to fully disclose the company's true value." Id. This 
court allowed the trial court to divide the estate as of the date of separation, 
rather than divorce, in order to compensate for the fact that the husband may 
have dissipated or hidden the value of the business in an effort to avoid losing it 
in the divorce. Id. at 1052. This court recognized that "[a]ssets are usually valued 
at the rune of the divorce decree," but cited California case law for the 
proposition that, "where one party has dissipated an asset, hidden its value, or 
otherwise acted obstructively, the trial court may, under its broad discretion, 
value the property at an earlier date, i.e., separation." Id. 
Following Peck, several Utah cases have allowed a trial court to divide 
marital property as of the date of separation rather than the date of divorce if it 
appeared that one party had hidden, spent or otherwise obstructed assets during 
the litigation. In Ouk v. Ouk, for example, the petition for divorce was filed in 
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December 2007. 2015 UT App 104, ,r2, 348 P.3d 751. Two and a half years later, in 
June 2010, after the parties were legally divorced, but still before their property 
had been divided, the husband opened a $185,000 line of credit on the marital 
home "without [the wife's] knowledge and [she] never received any benefit or 
funds from that line of credit." Id. ,r,r2, 12. Because the money was unaccounted 
for, the trial court determined that the husband had dissipated those assets and 
this court affirmed. Id. ,r14. 
Other cases have followed the same pattern: a n·ial court may divide a 
marital estate as of the date of separation where it appears one spouse hid, spent, 
or otherwise obstructed assets during the pending divorce litigation. Below are a 
few examples: 
• Donnelly v. Donnelly, 2013 UT App 84, ,r,r45, 47,301 P.3d 6 (affirming 
division as of date of separation and listing cases where it was 
appropriate to use valuation as of date of separation); 
• Andrus v. Andrus, 2007 UT App 291, ,r,r12-13, 169 P.3d 754 (affirming 
calculation of stock's value based on average price on various dates 
during period of separation); 
• Parker v . Parker, 2000 UT App 30, ,r,r3,12, 996 P.2d 565 (affirming 
valuation of estate on day of separation rather than day of divorce 
where wife appeared to have spent $100,000 to "live on" during 
pendency of action); 
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• Marshall v. Marshall, 915 P.2d 508,516 n.14 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (trial 
court did not abuse its discretion when valuing estate as of date of 
separation because husband acted obstructively in failing to give 
accurate verifiable accountings of income and assets on day of trial); 
• Shepherd v. Shepherd, 876 P.2d 429, 433 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (trial 
court did not abuse its discretion in dividing marital estate as of date 
of separation rather than date of divorce where one spouse had 
"depleted the liquid assets of the marital estate during the pendency 
of the action"); 
• Morgan v. Morgan, 795 P.2d 684,687 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (citing Peck 
for proposition that trial court may value property as of two weeks 
before trial if one party hides or dissipates assets); 
• Andersen. v. Andersen., 757 P.2d 476, 479-80 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) 
(remanding to trial court to detennine what had happened to $5,000 
in IRA that was liquidated between time of separation and time of 
divorce). 
Paul has found no Utah cases dividing marital assets of a date earlier than 
separation, as the court did here. Nor has Paul found any Utah case dividing 
assets that never existed but only could have existed had the parties lived their 
lives differently, as the court did here. 
Each of these errors is described below. 
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1.2 The trial court erred as a matter of law when it determined 
that income that was never earned, but only imputed, could 
be considered "dissipated" 
First, the trial court erred as a matter of law when it "imputed" to the 
·· marital estate money that was never earned. (R.255A,256 (attached at Addendum 
C)) Specifically, the trial court determined that, after he left Oracle when his 
health deteriorated, Paul was obligated to work rather than live off his 
investments. The trial court detennined that, even with his physical limitations, 
Paul was capable of earning - and "should have earned" - $40,000 per year. 
(R.254,255A,256.)3 In total, the trial court added into the body of divisible marital 
assets $63,333 that was merely imputed income - not income that in fact never 
existed. 
"Imputation," as it is used in Utah Code section 78B-12-203(7)(a), allows a 
court to impute income to a spouse when determining the spouse's income as 
part of a child support calculation. The analysis requires the court to determine 
"whether the [spouse] is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed and, if so, 
how much inco1ne ought to be imputed." Christian v. Christian, 2014 UT App 283, 
3 The trial court also made these specific findings. The court determined that Paul 
earned more than this during 2008, so he had met his obligation. (R.255A.) But in 
2009, he earned $0, and so the trial court added $40,000 into the corpus of 
divisible marital assets. (R.255A.) And in 2010, the trial court only considered 
that part of the year that Paul did support Tanja and pay the mortgage; the trial 
court determined that Paul "should have earned" 7 /12 of $40,000, or $23,333. 
(R.256.) The trial court added that number to the body of divisible marital assets. 
(R.256.) The trial court gave no explanation as to why it believed Paul was 
obligated to support Tanja until - but only until- they separated. 
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if 3, 341 P.3d 254 (internal quotation marks omitted). "A spouse is voluntarily 
unemployed or underemployed when [he or she] intentionally chooses of his or 
her own free will to become w1employed or w1deremployed." Id. (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
Iinputation is a standard part of calculating child support, and may also be 
helpful when calculating alimony. Utah Code§§ 78B-12-203(7)(a), 30-3-5(8)(a)(ii); 
Rayner v. Rayner (Rayner I), 2013 UT App 269, if10, 316 P.3d 455 (attached at 
Addendum F). The purpose of allowing imputation is to ensure that neither 
spouse is voluntarily under- or unemployed for purposes of calculating support 
for the1nselves, their ex-spouses, or their children. Utah Code§§ 78B-12-203(7)(a), 
30-3-5(8)(a)(ii); Rayner I, 2013 UT App 269, if10. 
Notably, the court's authority to award both child support and alimony is 
prospective. Utah Code§§ 78B-12-202(1), 203(1). Paul has found no Utah case that 
extends imputation to the context of distributing marital assets, like the court did 
here. In other words, no Utah case has retroactively imputed income to a spouse 
and then divided the imputed income as if it were a marital asset, ordering one 
spouse to pay the other imputed wages. 
Nor should this court allow such a procedure to become the law. Were 
such a process part of divorce law, innumerable divorce cases would ask 
whether one spouse had been voluntarily unemployed or undere1nployed during 
the marriage and, if so, allow the judge to impose on the underearner a debt of all 
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the money he or she might have earned. The implications of this are endless: stay-
at-home parents, career students, people whose parents support them, people 
taking early retirement, underearners married to overspenders, people who 
1- ~ - • 
would rather work less than their absolute maxilnum, and, as here, those who 
need not work because they have adequate investments at their disposal. Indeed, 
the purpose of a divorce proceeding is to allow the parties to separate and move 
forward, not to compensate one party for any of the other's perceived wrongs 
during the marriage. Bell v. Bell, 2013 UT App 248, if21, 312 P.3d 951. 
The trial court's imposition on Paul that he should have worked rather 
than live off his investments, and that he now owes to Tanja all the money he 
could have earned had he (or they) chosen otherwise, is unsupported by Utah 
law, bad policy, and error as a matter of law. This court should reverse that 
ruling, make clear that imputation is not to be used to retroactively build the 
marital estate, and eliminate $63,333 of the trial court's calculation of dissipated 
assets.4 
4 Even if this court concludes that the trial court did not err when it concluded 
that the term" dissipation" can refer to income that was imputed but was in fact 
never ea1ned, the trial court still erred because it considered Paul's imputed gross 
income but, at most, should have considered only his imputed net income. The 
failure to consider Paul's tax burden constitutes plain reversible error. Fullmer v. 
Fullmer, 2015 UT App 60, ,Ill, 347 P.3d 14 (describing plain error standard); 
Widdison. v. Widdison, 2014 UT App 233, ,Il0, 336 P.3d 1106 (re1nanding for 
findings on tax consequences of custody decision). In its alimony determination, 
the trial court assumed Paul had a 20% tax burden. (R.116.) Yet in computing the 
dissipated marital assets, the trial court considered the full $40,000 per year, 
rather than the net income. (R.255A,256.) Paul has argued that using any amount 
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1.3 The trial court erred as a matter of law when it determined 
that II dissipation" can ref er to money that was spent before 
separation without a finding of obstruction 
Second, the trial court erred when it determined that" dissipation" applied 
to marital assets that were spent in the twenty-seven months before the parties 
separated even though there was no finding of obstructive behavior. For the 
reasons described below, this court should reverse the trial court's decision as a 
1natter of law and vacate the remaining $108,762 from the calculation of 
dissipated assets. 
"Assets are usually valued at the time of the divorce decree." Peck, 738 
P.2d at 1052. The reason for this is clear: "[T]he court must distribute the items of 
marital property .. . with a view toward allowing each party to go forward with 
his or her separate life." Bell, 2013 UT App 248, if21. For this reason, " [e]ach party 
is .. . presumed to be entitled to ... fifty percent of the 111arital property." Dunn 
v. Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314, 1323 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). But for the sake of equity, 
"where one party has dissipated an asset, hidden its value, or otherwise acted 
obstructively, the trial court 1nay, under its broad discretion, value the property 
at an earlier date, i.e., separation." Peck, 738 P.2d at 1052. 
Two points are relevant. 
of imputed income is incorrect; but if this court rejects that argument, it stands to 
reason that only the net amount should be considered dissipated because Tanja 
would not have received any share of Paul's income taxes. At a minimum, this 
court should vacate 20% of $63,333, or $12,666.66 of the trial court's calculation of 
dissipated assets. 
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1.3.1 The trial court erred because it divided the marital 
property twenty-seven months before separation 
First, the trial court did not divide the property at separation, but reached 
back twenty-seven months before the parties separated and divided the assets as of 
that date. (R.255A.) As described supra, Paul has found no Utah case dividing a 
marital estate as of a date before separation, nor has he found any Utah case 
finding dissipation as of a date earlier than separation. 
The absence of such a case reflects the policy that underlies divorce 
proceedings: the distribution of marital property during a divorce is intended to 
help people move forward with their lives, not to compensate the spouses for the 
other's actions during the marriage. Utah law does not regulate people's 
expenditures during their marriages; does not assign each party an economic 
value upon divorce; and does not atte1npt to determine whether married parties 
spent their money in legitimate or not legitimate ways or earned or did not earn 
their potential. Nor is divorce law intended to equalize spousal behavior during 
the marriage in terms of dollars or compensate spouses for the other's behavior 
during the marriage. A rule that allowed for assets to be divided prior to 
separation is subject to extreme abuse. 
This court should reverse the trial court's ruling as a matter of law and 
clarify that a marital estate should not be divided inequitably as of a date earlier 
· than separation on the basis of dissipation. 
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1.3.2 Even if this court concludes that dissipation may occur 
before separation, the trial court nevertheless erred in 
finding dissipation because it did not find that Paul acted 
obstructively 
Second, not only did the court divide the 1narital estate as of twenty-seven 
months before the parties separated, but it did so without fin.ding that Paul acted 
obstructively. The guidance of this court and the Utah Supreme Court makes 
clear that the court may divide the marital estate inequitably "where one party 
has dissipated an asset, hidden its value, or otherwise acted obstructively, the trial 
court 1nay, in the exercise of its equitable powers, value a marital asset at some 
time other than the tiine the decree is entered, such as at separation." Goggin II, 
2013 UT 16, if49 (e1nphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). The term 
"obstructively" indicates that whatever behavior that caused the money to be 
spent must have been obstructive: Goggin II offers the dissipation of an asset and 
the hiding of an asset's value as two examples of obstructive actions. Id. 
The logical corollary is that non-obsh·uctive actions would not justify a 
departure from the customary 50/50 division of marital assets. In other words, 
the term" dissipation" does not simply refer to all spending by one spouse, but is 
merely one example of actions that have been done" obstructively." Were it 
otherwise, the trial court could divide a marital estate inequitably on the basis of 
any or all spending during a marriage and call it" dissipation." 
Rather than finding that certain expenditures were" obstructive," or made 
for the purpose of dissipating the marital estate, the trial court foU11d that Paul 
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spent $39,034.16 on items that the court thought were "not legitimate marital 
expenses." The terms are not synonymous, and a holding by this court that they 
were would lead to absurd results. Consider for example, the many non-essential 
items spouses purchase that the other spouse does not use and of which the other 
spouse may or may not consider "legitimate": clothing, shoes, personal products, 
vacations, gifts, hobbies, vehicles, luxury items, even sometimes job training or 
higher education. Some judges might not consider those items "legiti.J.nate 
marital expenses," but neither does Utah law consider them" obstructive" 
spending that must be paid back upon divorce. 
The trial court's first and second set of findings are described below. To be 
clear, twice the trial court failed to find that Paul acted obstructively. The lack of 
findings does not mean this court should remand; it means the record does not 
have evidence that would support such a finding. 
In its first set of findings, the trial court determined that Paul improperly 
spent nearly $200,000 during the marriage, although it could not identify what 
the allegedly improper purchases had been: 
Now the Court knows that the respondent's position is he spent all 
of that. But the fact is that to support the family in the way they 
were accustomed to be supported he did not need to spend that. He 
spent a lot of money on himself, on trips, on entertainment on doing 
things that were not by way of family expenses and so regardless of 
it supposedly having been spent already, the amount of retirement 
proceeds ... should be equally divided ... . 
(R.115 (attached at Addendum A.)) 
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This court rejected those findings in Rayner I, writing: "the evidence 
addressing the use of the liquidated assets was disputed, and subsidiary findings 
cannot be reasonably implied. The h·ial court did not explain why it concluded 
that the liquidation and spending of the assets qualified as dissipation." 2013 UT 
App 269, ,T22 (citation 01nitted). This court also criticized the trial court for failing 
to heed the "extensive testimony and exhibits [that] were presented regarding 
how the liquidated funds were spent." Id. In fact, as this court observed, so much 
testimony was presented that the trial court expressly decided not to review it: 
"[t]here were 1nany docu1nents filed and staten1ent[s] as to what inco1ne and 
expenses were. There was 1nuch that would have taken a forensic accountant to 
analyze." Id. (quoting the trial court at R.114.) Given these flaws, this court 
concluded that the trial court's statement" does not provide' sufficiently detailed' 
support for the trial court's conclusion," and therefore re1nanded. Id. ,r,r22-23. 
On remand, the trial court's "amended" and "supplemental" findings are 
longer and have more paragraph breaks, but they too make no mention of the 
motivation for Paul's spending. They simply state that certain expenditures are 
"not used for legitimate marital purposes" - a characterization that drastically 
changes the test from obstruction. This brief copies at length the relevant 
amended and supplemental findings to demonstrate that there are no findings 
that Paul's spending was obstructive. In short, the new findings are no more 
adequate than the original to support a finding of dissipation: 
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56. Because Respondent, and not Petitioner, had control over the 
amount that he liquidated from his retirement funds ... and because 
Respondent, and not Petitioner, had primary control over and access 
to the liquidated retirement funds, it is appropriate and equitable to 
attribute the apparent dissipation of marital assets .... 
57. Respondent's testimony that it was Petitioner that dissipated 
these marital assets is not supported by financial documentation and 
is not credible given that he had primary control over and access to 
the liquidated retirement funds. 
58. . . . Respondent has failed to present sufficient evidence to 
demonstrate that the apparent $188,095 of dissipated marital assets 
were actually used for some legitimate marital purpose. 
59. While there is insufficient evidence to show exactly how and 
where all of Respondent's liquidated retirement funds were spent, 
the financial documentation demonstrates that: 
• In Nove1nber 2009 and April 2010, Respondent wrote 
checks totaling $1,100 to Richard Mathis; 
• In March 2010, Respondent purchased three season passes 
to Cedar Point, an amusement park in Sandusky, Ohio, for 
Respondent, the parties' daughter, and Mr. Mathis, which 
totaled $399; 
• Fro1n January 2008 through May 2010, Respondent spent 
$3,215.68 on adult entertainment, including viewing 
pornography via the Internet and television, and 
frequenting private men's bathhouses, hotels, and adult 
themed boutiques and stores; 
• From May 2008 through May 2010, Respondent spent $498 
for legal services frmn ARAG Legal Services; 
• From January 2008 through August 2010, Respondent 
made $19,743.51 in purchases of Melaleuca products and 
services; and 
• From April 2008 through July 2010, Respondent spent 
$14,077.97 while traveling to locations, including as [sic] 
Delaware, Pennsylvania, Nevada, and California. 
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60. These expenditures, [totaling $39,034.16] which Respondent 
1nade fro1n his liquidated retirement funds, were not used for 
legitimate marital purposes and are illustrative of Respondent's 
dissipation of the parties' marital assets for his personal expenses 
that were above and beyond that of the parties' historical 
expenditures. 
61-64. [finding not credible Paul's argu1nents that the six 
enumerated expenditures were legitimate family expenses] 
65. Given that Respondent spent the liquidated retirement funds 
on his personal expenses, and not for legitimate marital purposes, 
that these expenditures were not consistent with the parties' 
historical practices, that the dissipated marital assets comprise a 
substantial a1nount of the parties' 1narital estate, that Respondent 
had primary control over and access to the liquidated retirement 
funds, and that Respondent failed to submit sufficient 
documentation to precisely account for how and where the 
liquidated retirement funds were spent, it is appropriate and 
equitable to hold Respondent accountable for the entire amount of 
the dissipated marital assets. 
(R.256-257B) ( emphasis added). The court subtracted $16,000 for the daughter's 
car and concluded that Paul is accountable for $172,095 in dissipated assets. (Id.) 
It is essential to recognize that the trial court did not find that these 
expenses were obstructive, but were simply "not legitimate." And the court did 
not explain each item. Consider the most significant single expense of the 
$39,034.16: $19,743.51 for Melaleuca healthcare products and services for the 
thirty-month period fr01n January 2008 (rather than April 2008) to August 2010 
(rather than July). (R.257;148:18.) Paul testified that the parties had purchased 
items from Melaleuca for over twenty years and that, in the last few years, he 
and the parties' children used primarily Melaleuca vitamins and cleaning 
supplies. (R.149:88-89.) Tanja indicated that Paul bought Melaleuca products 
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mostly for himself: vitamins, creams, and muscle builders. (R.149:99.) Paul did 
not disagree; he credits the Melaleuca products with having significantly helped 
his health and, in particular, alleviating his AIDS symptoms. (R.148:48-49.) 
But the court concluded that the Melaleuca purchases were not legitimate 
marital expenses because they were Paul's "personal expenses" and not 
consistent with the parties' historical expenditures. (R.257 A.) 
Regardless of the factual truth of this statement, the legal conclusion is 
incorrect. Without a finding that Paul's spending was obstructive, pre-separation 
spending on his "personal expenses" cannot be considered dissipated. Were it 
otherwise, one spouse's spending on themselves or on something their partner 
did not approve - or claimed upon divorce to have not approved - could 
always be considered "dissipation." Divorce courts would find themselves 
weighing each partner's spending over the course of the marriage to determine 
what was "legitimate" and what was not. To avoid this unworkable scenario, the 
case law of this court and the Utah Supreme Court indicates that the estate 
should be divided equally to the spouses unless one party has acted 
obstructively through dissipation, hiding assets, or some other action. 
In short, the court's finding that Paul's spending before separation was 
"dissipation" is unsupported by case law, and no evidence suggests that Paul 
acted obstructively. This court should reverse as a matter of law the conclusion 
that Paul" dissipated" the marital estate by spending money prior to separation. 
33 
1.4 The trial court erred as a matter of law because it estimated 
the "upper limit" of possible dissipation and therefore 
failed to adhere to Rayner I's mandate 
Even if this court disagrees with the above, and concludes that a marital 
estate may be divided twenty-seven months before the parties separate without a 
finding of obsh·uction, the h·ial court's decision still fails under the guidelines set 
forth in Rayner I. Specifically, the trial court erred as a matter of law when it 
concluded that Paul should be held responsible for the difference between the 
am.aunt that the trial court detennined was actually dissipated ($39,034.16) and 
the amount the trial court determined was presumably dissipated ($172,095). The 
difference at issue in this argument is $133,060.84. 
In Rayner I, this court explained that, when considering dissipation, h·ial 
courts are instructed to consider multiple factors: "how the 1noney was spent, 
including whether funds were used to pay legitimate marital expenses or 
individual expenses; the parties' historical practices; the 1nagnitude of any 
depletion; the timing of the challenged actions in relation to the separation and 
divorce; and any obstructive efforts that hinder the valuation of the assets." 2013 
UT App 269, if19 (citations omitted). As explained above, such analysis should 
be considered always in terms of whether the spouse's spending was obstructive. 
The penalty for obstructive spending is harsher when a spouse attempts to 
hide from the court the amount of 1noney spent. When "a spouse's behavior 
prevents the court from deternuning the precise amount of dissipated assets, the 
court should estimate, to the best of its ability, the upper limit of the amount of 
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assets that the spouse may have dissipated." Goggin II, 2013 UT 16, if 53 
(emphasis added). For example, in Goggin II, a case illustrating the proper 
application of the estimation exception, the husband, during separation," acted 
obstructively, "hid[] at least some of the assets," and" consistently refused to 
respond to discovery requests and comply with the court's orders to provide an 
accounting." Id. ,rso. Under those circumstances, the court was allowed to 
"estimate . . . the upper limit of the amount of assets that the spouse may have 
dissipated." Id. if 53. 
Rayner I likewise emphasized that the" estimation" approach is 
appropriate "only when" the spouse's behavior prevents the court from 
determining the precise amount of dissipated assets. 2013 UT App 269, if22 
(emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). Any such estimation 
"must be supported by sufficiently detailed findings of fact that explain the trial 
court's basis for ... deviation [from the general rule]." Id. if21. 
If there is not enough evidence to support the estimation approach, then 
the marital estate must be divided according to the customary procedure: "When 
insufficient evidence is presented to the court to support a finding of dissipation, 
the general rules governing the valuation of marital property apply." Id. if22. 
Here, the court made findings that Paul spent $39,034.16, but held that 
amount was "illustrative" of the amount he should be held responsible for, or 
$172,095. (R.256-257B.) This amounts to an improper "estimat[ion of] the upper 
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limit of the amount of assets that the spouse may have dissipated," unless there 
is evidence that Paul's behavior "prevent[ed] the court from determining the 
precise amount of dissipated assets." Rayner I, 2013 UT App 269, ~22 (internal 
quotation marks 01nitted). There is not. And twice the trial court 1nade no 
findings to that effect. 
A portion of the h·ial court's supplemental findings of fact are reproduced 
again below, this time with an emphasis on the trial court's conclusion that 
because Paul spent $39,034.16 on items that the trial court considered to be non-
legitimate marital expenses, that number is "illustrative" and Paul should 
actually be held responsible for $172,095: 
56. Because Respondent, and not Petitioner, had control over the 
amount that he liquidated frmn his retirement funds . .. and because 
Respondent, and not Petitioner, had primary control over and access 
to the liquidated retirement funds, it is appropriate and equitable to 
attribute the apparent dissipation of marital assets .... 
58. . .. Respondent has failed to present sufficient evidence to 
demonsh·ate that the apparent $188,095 of dissipated 1narital assets 
were actually used for some legitiinate marital purpose. 
59. While there is insufficient evidence to show exactly how and 
where all of Respondent's liquidated retirement funds were spent, 
the financial docu1nentation demonstrates that: 
.. . [six enumerated expenses totaling $39,034.16] ... 
60. These expenditures, which Respondent made from his 
liquidated retirement funds, were not used for legitimate marital 
purposes and are illustrative of Respondent's dissipation of the 
parties' marital assets for his personal expenses that were above and 
beyond that of the parties' historical expenditures . . . . 
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65. Given that Respondent spent the liquidated retire1nent funds 
on his personal expenses, and not for legitimate marital purposes, 
that these expenditures were not consistent with the parties' 
historical practices, that the dissipated marital assets comprise a 
substantial amount of the parties' marital estate, that Respondent 
had primary control over and access to the liquidated retirement 
funds, and that Respondent failed to submit sufficient 
documentation to precisely account for how and where the 
liquidated retirement funds were spent, it is appropriate and 
equitable to hold Respondent accountable for the entire amount of 
the dissipated marital assets ... [which, subtracting $16,000 for the 
daughter's car is] $172,095." 
(R.256-257B (emphasis added).) 
Nothing in these findings suggests that Paul's behavior prevented the 
court from determining the precise amount of dissipated assets, as was required 
by Rayner I. And, again as described by Rayner I, without such evidence or 
findings to support it, the trial court was not authorized to estimate the upper 
limit of potentially dissipated assets. 
This court "cannot affirm [the trial court's] determination when the trial 
court abuses its discretion by failing to enter specific, detailed findings 
supporting its financial determinations." Rayner I, 2013 UT App 269, ,r4 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). "When insufficient evidence is presented to the court 
to support a finding of dissipation, the general rules governing the valuation of 
marital property apply." Id. ,r22. 
The trial court has twice failed to make specific findings that Paul 
dissipated the $133,060.84 difference between the amount that the trial court 
determined was dissipated ($39,034.16) and the amount that finding illustrated 
($172,095.) The reason the trial court has twice failed to make those findings is 
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because no evidence supports those findi.J.1.gs. At a 1ninimum, this court should 
vacate the h·ial court's finding that Paul's spending" illustrated" an additional 
dissipation of $133,060.84. 
Paul asks this court not to remand, but to rule as a matter of law that the 
h·ial court incorrectly estimated the upper li1nit of potentially dissipated assets 
and should instead have applied the general rules governing the valuation of 
1narital property - i.e., to divide the marital estate in half as of the day of divorce. 
1.5 The trial court's conclusion that Paul's expenditures were 
"illustrative" of dissipation is further undermined 
Even were it somehow true that Paul's spending and lack of earning 
i.J.1.come constituted" dissipation," the trial court's conclusion is still inequitable 
for at least two reasons. First, the h·ial court erred when it "just assmne[d]" that 
the fa1nily' s legitimate family expenses were $88,047. (R.114.) Second, the trial 
court erred when it failed to critically consider Tanja' s involvement in the 
deterioration of the falnily' s finances. 
1.5.1 The trial erred when it "assumed" the family's legitimate 
annual expenses were $88,047 and worked backward 
The h·ial court fixed $88,047 as the falnily' s legitimate expenses because 
that was an average of Paul's salary during the years 2003 to 2007. (R.113-14.) 
The h·ial court "[found] this is a reasonable way to just assmne that it took 
$88,047" to support the falnily. (R.114.) The trial court required all other 
expenditures to be explained. 
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In doing so, the trial court rendered an oversimplified and legally incorrect 
formula: amount dissipated = money liquidated + money imputed ~ expenses 
"assume[d]" to be reasonable. This formula cuts against repeated instructions from 
this court and the supreme court that any finding of dissipation "must be 
supported by sufficiently detailed findings of fact that explain the trial court's 
basis for" deviation from the general rule that each spouse is entitled to half the 
1narital estate on the day of divorce. Rayner I, 2013 UT App 269, «j[21 (internal 
quotation marks 01nitted). The trial court is required to calculate "the precise 
ainount of dissipated assets" and is allowed to estimate only where the spouse's 
behavior prevents it from doing so. Goggin II, 2013 UT 16, «j[53; Rayner I, 2013 UT 
App 269, «jf 20. Said differently, Goggin II and Rayner I teach that the amount of 
dissipated assets should be found forward, not backward. 
In fact, in Rayner I, this court critiqued as problematic the trial court's 
approach of estimating the family's reasonable expenses: the court noted that 
"rather than calculating the amount of assets actually dissipated, the trial court 
based its valuation on an assumption of legitimate family expenses." 2013 UT 
App 269, «jf 22 ( emphasis added). This criticism underscores the above analysis 
that the tr·ial court should have focused only on money that was actually shown 
to be dissipated, and not ballooned the number for any reason. 
But despite this court's criticism, the trial court did not change its 
approach on remand. Even on remand, the trial court did not account for the fact 
39 
that the family had significant debt at this same tilne - an indicator that in fact 
the family was spending more than it was making. Nor did the trial court 
accom1.t for the fact that during the years in question, the Rayners paid for 
several big-ticket items for their young adult children, including a basketball 
court, cars, down payments, weddings, and college tuition. (R.211;R.149:46-47; 
148:51-52,65,67.) The lTial court's assmnption that a family's legitimate expenses 
should be presumed to be an average of the breadwinner's last five years of 
salary is simply not a basis to then work backward to find the amount dissipated. 
1.5.2 The trial court erred when it did not include the amount 
of money that Tanja spent or wasted 
The h·ial court's estilnation of the upper liinit of potential dissipation is 
also undermined because the trial court failed to consider Tanja' s role in the 
family's finances. The h·ial court stated that Paul had "primary" control over and 
access to the funds, a staten1.ent that implicitly concedes that Tanja had 
"secondary" control. (R.257 A-257B.) And indeed, Tanja testified that she could 
and did 1nake withdrawals from Paul's account, that she had no records of her 
expenditures, that she had her own Social Security money that she did not 
deposit into joint bank accounts, and that she used cash. (R.148:39-40;149:96-97.) 
Paul repeatedly suggested that Tanja was responsible for spending too 
much money. (R.199,202-04.) Having made that assertion, Paul was entitled to 
have Tanja justify her spending. This court has explained: after an "initial 
showing of apparent dissipation" by one party, the burden shifts to the other 
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party "to show that the funds were not dissipated, but were used for some 
legitimate marital purpose." Parker, 2000 UT App 30, ,r,r13, 15. 
However, despite Paul's allegations, the trial court did not require Tanja to 
prove or justify her own expenditures. Tanja conceded she withdrew $3,859 from 
Paul's funds, but Paul alleged it was much 1nore than that. After Rayner I, when 
the trial court asked for additional evidence, Paul also asserted that Tanja made 
"undisclosed and unauthorized withdrawals from the [family] funds." (R.199.) 
He indicated that in 2008, she withdrew $5,245.00 (R.202); in 2009, she withdrew 
$6,324.41 (R.203); and between January and July 2010, she withdrew $8,512.01 
(R.204.) That amount totals $20,081.42. 
Paul also alleged that Tanja had been wasteful with the family's money. 
Paul stated repeatedly that he tr·ied to sell the home and engage in other cost 
saving measures but Tanja refused. (R.200;149:16,84-86,99.) He testified that she 
spent several thousand dollars over budget on their son's wedding. (R.148:51-52.) 
H e suggested that on January 1, 2008, Tanja's Horizon credit union account had a 
balance of $127,000.00, but that by the time of tr·ial, that number had dwindled to 
a negative $2,000.00. (R.205.) He noted that the combined amount of money 
alleged by the trial court to be "missing" is roughly similar to the amount of 
money that was owing on the mortgage and he informed the court that he 
believed she used the money to pay her sister to pay the 1nortgage. (R.34;239.) 
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Tanja denied the spending, but never produced a forensic accountant or 
any other expert to explain where her funds had gone. (R.200,218-27;149:96.) And 
the trial court never required her to, even though this court's case law clearly 
shifts the burden to her "to show that the funds were not dissipated, but were 
used for some legifunate marital purpose." Parker, 2000 UT App 30, if if 13, 15. 
In short, both parties had access to marital funds during the marriage. 
Without evidence regarding who spent what, and without any evidence that 
Paul's behavior prevented the court from determining where the money went, 
the h·ial court erred when it assmned that Paul spent every last missing penny on 
non-marital expenses. 
1.6 Summary of the trial court's errors regarding dissipation 
In short, the trial court erred when it concluded that (1) imputed income 
could be considered part of the marital assets; (2) a marital estate could be 
divided long before the parties separated without findings of obstruction; and (3) 
it was appropriate to esfunate the upper boundary of potentially dissipated 
assets on the basis of "illustrative" expenditures. This court should vacate the 
h·ial court's decision that Paul dissipated any assets. A proper calculation of the 
result is provided in Argument 2.3. 
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2. The trial court's findings of fact regarding the value of the respective 
retirement accounts are not supported by the evidence 
The trial court considered that the assets on the day of divorce included 
$50,896 in equity in the house;" approximately $10,000" in a retirement account 
of Tanja's; and $30,514 in a retire1nent account of Paul's. (R.112,257B.) The latter 
two nu1nbers are slightly different than the evidence. In each case, the error 
favors Tanja. Paul respectfully asks this court to calculate the division of marital 
assets using the evidence actually provided. 
2.1 Tanja's retirement account 
In the h·ial court's findings of fact, it first explained that Tanja' s retire1nent 
account was "valued at about $11,000." (R.111.) Then, in its conclusions of law in 
the sa1ne document, the trial court rounded this number down to 
"approximately $10,000." (R.115.) The court used the $10,000 figure again in its 
supplemental findings. (R.257B.) In fact, the documentation submitted by Tanja 
shows the balance was $10,806.69, which rounds to $10,807. (R.57.) Paul asks this 
court to correct the division of assets to use the more correct $10,807 figure that is 
supported by the record. 
2.2 Paul's retirement account 
As to Paul's retirement account, the trial court valued this asset at $30,514. 
(R.115;257B.) That number comes from Tanja's Exhibit 10, in which she 
submitted a statement from Paul's retirement account for the quarter January-
March 2010. (Pet.Ex.10.) Paul submitted a more current statement, for the quarter 
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July-September 2011, showing an account balance of $29,839. (Resp.Ex.8.) This 
was received by the trial court. (R.149:22-23.) That is also the number he put in 
his financial declaration. (R.100.) 
The trial court gave no reason, and there is no sound justification, for using 
the numbers provided by Tanja, which were more tha11 eighteen months out-of-
date at the time of trial, rather than the numbers provided by Paul. Paul asks this 
court to correct the division of assets to use the more correct $29,839 figure that is 
supported by the record. 
2.3 Summary 
The actual evidence shows that the assets include $50,896 in equity 
(R.112;115); $10,807 in Tanja's retiiement account (R.57;257B); and $29,839 in 
Paul's retirement account. (R.Resp.Ex.10;115,257B.) Those assets total $91,542. 
Because there is no equitable reason to divide the marital estate other than 
iJ.1 half, each party is entitled to $45,771. Tanja has already been awarded tl1e 
marital home, and so she should be attributed $50,896 iJ.1 equity. To equalize the 
estate, this court should award Paul the full value of his Deseret Mutual Tax 
Sheltered Annuity Plan ($28,839), the full value of Tanja' s retiiement account 
($10,807), and a judgment against Tanja in the amount of $6,125. 
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3. Alimony 
The trial court also erred :in fix:ing the alimony award. The court abused its 
discretion when it assigned Paul to pay :installment debt that has m:inimum 
monthly payments of $1,550 and yet allowed him only $250 :in his budget to do 
so, leav:ing him no real disposable income that allows him to pay alimony. The 
court made this determ:ination :in its :initial divorce decree. (R.116-17,122.) Paul 
raised it aga:in on remand but the trial court entered the same determination. 
(R.213-14,244,298.) This fails to allow Paul to make his debt payments, and fails 
to "equalize the poverty" between the parties. 
The purposes of alimony are "(1) to get the parties as close as possible to 
the same standard of liv:ing that existed dur:ing the marriage, (2) to equalize the 
standards of liv:ing of each party, and (3) to prevent the recipient spouse from 
becom:ing a public charge. The core function of alimony is therefore economic - it 
should not operate as a penalty against the payor nor a reward to the recipient." 
Roberts v. Roberts, 2014 UT App 211, ,114, 335 P.3d 378. Said differently, "[t]he 
purpose of alimony is to provide support for the wife and not to inflict punitive 
damages on the husband." English v. English, 565 P.2d 409,411 (Utah 1977) 
(:internal quotation marks omitted). 
"Trial courts consider a number of factors when determining the amount 
and duration of alimony, focus:ing pr:incipally on the three Jones factors: (1) the 
f:inancial condition and needs of the recipient spouse, (2) the ability of the 
recipient spouse to produce sufficient :income, and (3) the ability of the payor 
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spouse to provide support." Roberts, 2014 UT App 211, ,r12 (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
Further, where post-divorce resources are insufficient to meet both parties' 
needs, the court should split the deficit evenly. "When this situation arises, the 
trial court must determine how to equitably allocate the burden of insufficient 
income that occurs when the resources that were sufficient to cover the expenses 
of a couple must now be stretched to accommodate the needs of two individuals 
living separately." Keyes v. Keyes, 2015 UT App 114, if 39,351 P.3d 90; see also Utah 
Code § 30-3-5(8)(£) ("The court may, under appropriate circu1nstances, atte1npt to 
equalize the parties' respective standards of living."). 
The issue is preserved. But even if it were not, this court should review the 
issue for plain error. An unpreserved issue may be addressed on appeal under 
the plain error doctrine. State v. Weaver, 2005 UT 49, if 18, 122 P.3d 566. Clai1ns for 
plain error require obvious, prejudicial error. State v. Lomu, 2014 UT App 42, if 6, 
321 P.3d 235. Here, the error was obvious because the trial court arbitrarily 
discounted Paul's ability to pay his debt while simultaneously ordering him to 
pay it, and prejudicial because Paul is left without the ability to meet his 
obligations. Even were he able to earn the income the trial court has imputed to 
hiln, the trial court has left him no meanil1gful way to provide for his own needs, 
debt that accrued during the 1narriage, and Tanja's alimony. 
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3.1 The trial court abused its discretion when it assigned all of 
the credit card debt and tax debt to Paul and yet reduced his 
budget for paying the debt, making it impossible for him to 
actually pay the debt 
The trial court determined that Paul should pay to Tanja $700 per month in 
alimony (R.122,299) using the following components: 
• Tanja' s allowed monthly expenses: $2,042.50 
• Tanja' s 1nonthly net social security il1con1e: $11085 
• Tanja' s monthly need: $960 
• Paul's allowed monthly expenses: $1,948 
• Paul's reasonable net imputed income: $2,6665 
• Paul's ability to pay: $700 
(R.116-17.) 
In fact, however1 the h·ial court abused its discretion in reaching these 
subsidiary numbers. A critical co1nponent of Paul's monthly expenses is his debt. 
The court ordered the parties to pay all of their "own" debt. (R.118;298.) For Paul, 
th_at included credit card debt that had accrued during the marriage, all of the 
taxes owing from the year 2010 when they filed their taxes "married filing 
separately," and a student loan he signed for then· daughter. (R.118;298.) 
At the time of trial, the uncontested minimum monthly payments on that 
debt were $1,550. (R.116-17.) After remand, Paul submitted a Declaration that 
indicated that the debts, in particular the interest and penalties on the Sallie Mae 
5 On appeal, Paul does not raise a challenge to the court's decision to impute 
income to him. 
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student loan, had increased. (R.214,244.) On his original financial declaration, 
Paul listed his "own" debts, as follows: 
Creditor Type of Debt Balance Monthly 
Payment 
Bank of America Visa credit card 8,483 280 
Bank of America Mastercard credit card 9,060 260 
Deseret First Credit Union credit card 1,566.17 100 
Deseret FiTst Credit Union overdraft 11,744.25 360 
Citi Bank/Sallie Mae daughter's student loan 14,131.85 200 
IRS 2010 taxes 7,949.24 200 
Utah State Tax Comn1'n 2010 taxes 3,425.07 150 
total 56,360 1,550 
(R.102 (attached at Addendum G.))6 
Breaking those debts into their discrete parts, Paul's debts look like this: 
2010 Tax Debt (Married Filing Separate! .r) 
IRS 2010 taxes 7,949.24 200 
Utah State Tax Comm'n 2010 taxes 3,425.07 150 
total tax debt 11,374.31 350 
Consumer Debt Accrued During the Marriage 
Bank of America credit card 8,483 280 
Bank of America credit card 9,060 260 
Deseret First Credit Union credit card 1,566.17 100 
Deseret First Credit Union overdraft 11,744.25 360 
total consumer debt 30,853 1,000 
Student Loans for Parties' Daughter 
Citi Bank/Sallie Mae 14,131.85 200 
Combined Total Monthly Payments 1,550 
(R.102.) 
6 The trial court awarded Tanja the house and whatever payment arrangements 
sh e had made with her sister. (R.112,118.) That issue is not disputed here. 
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But even though the h·ial court ordered him to pay that debt, the trial court 
essentially dismissed its financial impact when calculating Paul's monthly 
expenses. The court stated: "He has listed there a $1,550 for instalhnent payments 
which the court finds are not reasonable. The Court finds that a reasonable 
payment on installments is $250. Certainly, it is not reasonable for almost half of 
his expenses to be on installment payments, and he has some other thin.gs he 
could do about that. It is more i.J.nportant that he support his wife, than to take 
care of those other claims, however, the Court will allow him $250." (R.116-17.) 
Paul contends that the court's arbitrarily allowing hi.J.n $250 to pay his 
monthly debts rather than the $1,550 that it actually costs to pay the debt was an 
abuse of discretion. First, the court did not allow Paul enough money in his 
monthly budget to pay even his tax bill, let alone his credit card debt. Second, the 
court assigned that debt to Paul, but did not afford him the opportunity to pay it. 
Third, the court said "he has some other things he could do about that," but did 
not specify what exactly that might be. 
Each of these errors by itself was an abuse of the court's discretion. Paul 
asks this court to reverse and conclude that Paul should have been allowed 
enough in his budget to pay the debt the trial court assigned him, leaving him no 
ability to pay alimony. 
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3.2 The trial court failed to equalize the deficit between the 
parties 
The h·ial court's failure to afford Paul enough 1noney in his budget to meet 
his debt burden is also an abuse of discretion because it fails to "equalize the 
poverty" between the parties. "Equalization of inco1ne, which is perhaps better 
described as equalization of poverty, is a trial court's remedy for those situations 
in which one party does not earn enough to cover his or her demonstrated needs 
and the other party does not have the ability to pay enough to cover those 
needs." Keyes, 2015 UT App 114, i/39 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also 
Sellers v. Sellers, 2010 UT App 393, ,r3, 246 P.3d 173; Fish v. Fish, 2010 UT App 292, 
i/30, 242 P.3d 787. If the court does not equalize the shortfall, it should "explain 
its rationale for assigning a disproportionate percentage of the shortfall to one 
party." McPherson v. McPherson, 2011 UT App 382, i/16, 265 P.3d 839. 
Recently, this court held facially inequitable a h·ial court's equalization of 
income that was "not an mu·easonable approach at a theoretical level," but "[a]s 
a practical matter, ... [left] Husband without the ability to meet any of his most 
basic needs." Keyes, 2015 UT App 114, ,i,r39-40. There, the husband was left with 
$42 "to put toward his basic needs," putting him "in a position where he has 
insufficient means to sustain life on the most basic level." Id. ,r40. And although 
the wife in that case was also left with a shortfall, her resources were "more than 
adequate to cover her basic expenses for food and shelter." Id. This court noted 
"that 'shared misery' income equalization is often based - at least in part - on a 
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judge's detennination that one party or both must (and can) tighten their belts in 
the face of clearly insufficient resources." Id. But, importantly, "an allocation that 
on its face leaves one party with essentially no income for basic necessities 
cannot be deemed equitable without further explanation by the h·ial court." Id. 
As described below, the h·ial court's treatment of the parties' expenses and 
inco1nes leaves Paul with no income for basic necessities. 
Tanja stated that her monthly expenses were $2,585. (R.116.) The trial court 
discounted those expenses by $542.50, leaving her reasonable monthly expenses 
of $2,042.50. (R.116.) Tanja has disability income of $1,085, which leaves her with 
a deficit of $957.50. 
Paul stated that his monthly expenses were $3,677, of which $1,550 was the 
1ninimum monthly payments on debt. (R.100-01.) The trial court reduced Paul's 
monthly expenses by $177 for telephone, $152 for utilities, and $1,300 for 
minimum monthly payments. (R.116-17.) The trial court concluded that Paul's 
reasonable expenses ($3,677 -1,300 - 177 - 152) were $1,948. (R.117.) In fact, that 
math contains an error: $3,677 -1,300 -177 - 152 = $2,048. The h·ial court 
imputed to Paul monthly income of $2,666, which, if he actually earned it, would 
leave him a surplus of $718 according to the trial court's accounting error, but in 
fact leaves a surplus of $618. The trial court awarded $700 to Tanja in alimony. 
The trial court's assigrunent of the debt and corresponding adjustment in 
the budget leaves the parties with entirely disparate finances. Paul's debt 
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payments are $1,550, regardless of the trial court's adjushnents. Allowir1g him 
only $250 to pay them does nothing except artificially inflate the amount of 
money he has available to support Tanja and prevent hiin from meeting his own 
basic obligations. 
The trial court's only justification for this disparate treatn1ent, as stated 
above, was that it "is more important that he support his wife" than pay his debt. 
As it was in Keyes, this distribution is facially inequitable. Additionally, leaving 
Paul without enough to pay his debt forces him to accrue increasing interest and 
penalties that he cannot manage. 
This court should reverse the trial court's ruling, correct its n1ath, and 
allow Paul the full $1,550 per month that is necessary to 1nake his payments. 
With that calculation, Paul's needs are ($1,948 + 1,400) = $3,348. The trial court 
imputed him incmne of $2,666, which - if he in fact were earning it - would leave 
hi1n a deficit of $682. 
Given that the parties both have a shortfall and that Paul has been 
assigned to pay debt that amounts to $1,550 per month but has only been 
allowed $250 in his budget to do so, this court should reverse the trial court's 
conclusion and instead enter judgment stating that the trial court abused its 
discretion and, in fact, Paul has no ability to pay alimony. 
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• 
Conclusion 
Paul respectfully asks this court to reverse the trial court's conclusions and 
enter a final judginent that (1) vacates the entire dissipation analysis and instead 
divides the 1narital estate equally as of the date of divorce, using the corrected 
numbers described in Argument 2.3; and (2) vacates the alirn.ony award because 
Paul needs $1,550 in his budget to make the minimmn monthly pay1nents on his 
debt and therefore has no ability to pay alimony. 
Because this can be calculated as matter of law, and because Paul has 
already borne the costs of appealing this matter twice, this court should eliminate 
any more use of his or the judiciary' s resources and enter judgment in that 
amount. No remand is necessary because no factual findings will be left and 
" [n]o purpose would be served by again remanding with directions to enter 
findings." Paryzelc v. Paryzelc, 776 P.2d 78, 83 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
Paul respectfully asks that this court enter the final decision or remand 
only for the trial court to enter an order in accordance with this court's 
instructions. 
DATED this 8th day of October, 2015. 
ZIMMERMAN JONES BOOHER LLC 
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Certificate of Compliance With Rule 24(£)(1) 
I hereby certify that: 
1. This brief complies with the type-volume limitation of Utah R. App. 
P. 24(f)(l) because this brief contains 12,996 words, excluding the parts of the 
brief exe1npted by Utah R. App. P. 24(f)(l)(B). 
2. This brief c01nplies with the typeface requirements of Utah R. App. 
P. 27(b) because this brief has been prepared in a proportionally spaced typeface 
using Microsoft Word 2010 in 13 point Book Antiqua. 
DATED this _ _ day of October, 2015. 
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SECOND 
DISTRICT COURT 
'j 
IN THE SECO:t\lD DISTRICT COURT IN MlD FOR · 
DA V1S COUNTY, FARMINGTON DEPARTMENT, STA TE OF UT AH 
TANJA RODGERS RA YN'"ER 
Petitioner, 
vs: 
PAUL T. RAYN'"ER 
Respondent. 
FINDINGS OFF ACT and 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
CASE NO: 10-470-1766 
JUDGE: Michael G. Allphin 
COMJvlISSIONER: David S. Dillon 
The above entitled cause came on regularly for trial before the Honorable 
:Michael G. Allphin, District Judge after certification by.the Commissioner to the 
Distnct Court Judge, on December 28, 2011, and continued for further hearing on 
January 24, 2012. The Petitioner appeared in person and by Attorney George K. 
Fadel, and the Respondent appeared in person and by Attorney Steven R. 
Lawrence, Jr., at both of said hearings. The Court heard testimony provided by 
both parties together with other evidence received in the cause, and being fully 
advised in the matter the Court makes the following: 
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FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Petitioner and Respondent are bona fide and actual residents of Davis 
County, State of Utah and have been for more than three (3) months immediately 
prior to commencement of this action. 
2. Petitioner and Respondent are husband and wife having been married on 
:March 27, 1981 in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, and both are now 54 years of 
age. 
3. Jurisdiction is proper in this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Sec.78B-3-
101. 
4. Venue is proper in this Court in that Petitioner has resided for at least 90 
days or more in Davis County, Utah pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Sec.30-3-1(2) 
1997. 
5. The grounds upon which a divorce should be granted are irreconcilable 
difference rendering the continuation of this marriage impossible; the parties have 
attempted to reconcile these difference but they have been unsuccessfuJ in these 
endeavors, and irreconcilable differences of the marriage are ground for divorce. 
6. The parties have two children as issue of the marriage, both of whom have 
attained majority. 
7. Neither party should be required to maintain insurance for the benefit of the 
other party. 
8. By pretrial order, the Commissioner certified for trial by the Court issues as 
follows: 
a. The award of equity in the marital home located at 
b. The entitlement and amount of alimony to be awarded to the Petitioner 
considering her needs, employability, and the ability of the Respondent to 
, make payments of alimony based upon his historical earnings from 
employment. 
c. Pensions and Retirement Plans: 
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i. The Respondent is a participant in the Deseret Mutual Plan of the 
Church of Jesus Christ estimated at $30,500. 
ii. The Respondent will also be entitled to receive from the Church 
of Jesus Christ retirement about $867 per month. 
iii. The Petitioner has an entitlement from her teacher's retirement 
valued at about $11,000. 
d. The accounting and allocation ofliquid marital assets. 
e. The allocation ofresponsibility for marital debts. 
f. The entitlement and amount of an award of attorney fees to the 
Petitioner. 
9. · s ·orne eighteen years ago the parties constructed their borne on property at 
which is more particularly described as: 
The Petitioner provided $9,000 from her premarital assets towards acquisition and 
construction. The parties have lived separately since January, 2010. After the 
separation the Respondent continued to make payments on that home through July 
of 2010, and paid utilities and other items which the Court determines that he took 
care of his family support obligations through July 2010. Once the Respondent 
quit making the payment, the Petitioner had no ability to make those payments. 
After a couple· of months not being paid, a foreclosure action was started and 
proceeded forth until Petitioner's sister rescued that home from foreclosure by 
paying an amount of $162,884 to pay off the first mortgage, and then brought the 
second mortgage current. Because the Petitioner had no ability to make those 
payments on the second mortgage, the sister has as of December, 2010 made 16 
payments on that mortgage and as far as the Court can determine intends to 
continue for the foreseeable future. The sister also paid the property taxes for 
2010 and 2011 as well as paid for a number of repairs and maintenance of the 
home including $5,500 to replace the driveway and additional $3,045.19 for other 
repairs. For the amounts the sister advanced and continues to advance, the 
Petitioner, as security for the loan advancements, conveyed by Special Warranty 
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Deed her interest in the real property to her sister Sharree Rodgers on December 
16, 2010. The parties are entitled to one half on any equity that may be in the 
home, and to detennine what equity there is in the home, the Court finds that there 
was an appraisal completed on October 27, 2011. The appraiser found that the 
value of the home was $302,000. The Court finds that the Petitioner is entitled to 
deduct from that appropriate costs of sale of approximately $21,000 that would 
leave a value of $281,000. From that, the first mortgage that was satisfied by 
petitioner's sister for $162,884, the second mortgage which the sister has assumed, 
brought curren~ and continues to make payments has an approximate balance of 
$43,740. In addition, the sister has made payment for the fees to bring it current 
of $9,437. As noted above, the sister has -paid for the driveway of $5,500, 
additional repairs of $3,045.19 and the taxes for the year 2010, $2,646. 88 and for 
2011, $2,851 .72. The total of the mortgage payments, the maintenance repairs and 
the taxes is $230,104. Subtracting that from the value of $281,000 leaves a 
balance as equity of $50,896. The Court finds that the home should be awarded to 
the Petitioner, the home located in Bountiful. The Court finds that having an 
indebtedness of $230,104 leaves and equity of $50,896 for consideration in 
division of assets. 
10. According to testimony, there are two remaining retirement accounts. The 
Respondent bas a retirement account with Deseret Mutual Tax Sheltered Annuity 
Plan of$30,514.08. That was the testimony and in so1I1e of the document there 
seems to be an indication that there might be another account. Ifthere is, it ought 
to be factored in but I can't make a specific finding at this point. Also, the 
Petitioner has a retirement account of approximately $10,000. Both of these 
accounts need to be taken into consideration as it relates to \1/oodward v . 
Woodwar4 656 P .2d 431 (Utah 1982) under which each are. entitled to an equal 
portion of those retirement accounts. 
11. The parties each have incurred debt of their own. There appears to be no 
joint debt other than the home. The court will order that each party pay their own 
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debt, including, that the Respondent is to pay his tax liability for 2010 and there 
after. 
12. The Respondent supported the Petitioner through July of 2010. He paid the 
house payment, utilities and as far as the court can tell some other things related to 
the family expenses. He also liquidated some retirement that be had in a 
retirement savings account and also an IRA, some stocks; and he liquidated some 
ii.7. each of the years of 2008, 2009, and 2010. The Respondent V.'orked for Oracle 
Corporation until April of 2008 for an annual salary of $88,047. It was unclear to 
the Court after the testimony as to whether he quit or whether he was fired for 
cause; however he was terminated from his employment in April of 2008. He 
initially made an attempt to find another job and then after being offered a job in 
Nephi, for approximately, the testimony was $40,000 to $50,000 a year which the 
Court will use the figure $40,000 a year. He decided he didn't want to move to 
Nephi and so he turned that down and then as far as the Court can tell, didn't make 
any other efforts to :find employment thereafter. Because he was offered a job at 
$40,000 per year, and_ because he has education by way of a Bachelor of Science 
Degree and a Master of Science Degree in the computer field, the Court finds that 
he has the ability to work regardless of the health concerns that he has, the Court 
finds that he has the ability to work. He testified that he makes sometimes a few 
hundred dollars a year and sometimes goes in the hole dealing in Melaleuca 
products. The Court finds that is not reasonable employment, that as a result of 
his education, bis ability to work, that be is underemployed. He has failed to find 
a job and the Court finds that it is justified in imputing an income to the 
Respondent of $40,000 a year which is the amount of the job that he turned down. 
He very well could work and earn more than that but with the evidence that the 
Court has, the Court finds that the $40,000 per year as imputed income for 
purposes herein. 
The respondent earned an average salary for the 5 years preceding 2008, 
that is 2003 through 2007 of$88,047 . With that $88,047 he was able to support 
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himself and his wife, take care of the family expenses, take care of the debt and he 
did so. In 2008, he earned $62,307 for those first few months of the year and 
some oftbat, he testified was severance, but regardless for purposes of 2008, 
2009, and 2010, the Court is going to find that it was reasonable that the marital 
expenses would justify the amount of $88,047. In 2008, as indicated, he made 
$62,307, and so he would be short of that $88,047 that was necessary to support 
his family in the way they were accustomed .. He would be short $25,740. To 
make up for his shortfall, however, he sold stock in the amount $105,223. He ha.s 
not accounted for that. There were many documents filed and statement as to 
what income and expenses were. There was much that would have taken a 
forensic accountant to analyze. The Court finds this is a reasonable way to just 
assume that it took $88,047, he made $62,307, it was reasonable too that he take 
$25,740 from the stock that be sold in order to continue to support himself and his 
wife. He sold stock in the amount of $105,223. He needed $25,740 in order to 
continue to support the family. The remainder of that retirement income $79,483 
was retirement income of which each party is entitled to one half. 
For 2009, the Court finds it should impute $40,000 per year income to him. 
The Court did not find that for 2008 because he made more than that since he 
made $62,307, but in 2009 he was not employed other than his Melaleuca which 
be made a minimal amount. Thus the Court imputes $40,000 to him for 2009. In 
2009 he sold stock in the amount of $37,787. He liquidated $81,059 interest in an 
IFA for a total $118,846, thus if he needs $88,047 to support him and his wife, the 
court imputes $40,000 income that he reasonably could have made. That leaves a 
shortfall of $48,047. The court finds it is reasonable to subtract that amount from 
the stock and the liquidated IRA of $118,846 and subtracting $48,047 that leaves 
an amount $70,799 that Petitioner was entitled to one half interest in the sum of 
$35,399.50. 
Thus for 2008, it is $79,483 total retirement interest of which ~acb was 
entitled to one half; for 2009, $70,799 is retirement interest that each was entitled 
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to one half For the year 2010 again, the Court imputes $40,000 per year to him. 
He supported her for a period of seven months. Taking the previous figure of 
$88,047 divided by twelve times seven, then he needed for those first seven 
months that he actually supported her and himself $51,360. Imputing the $40,000 
per year divided by twelve times seven then during that seven months he could 
reasonable have earned $23,333. This leaves him a shortfall of $28,027. He has 
an IRA distribution in 2010 of $65,840. Subtracting what he needed from that 
distribution in order to support his fai11ily for those seven month, $28,027, from 
the $65,840 leaves a balance of $37,813 of retirement income of which the 
Petitioner is entitled to one half. 
To recapitulate, for the year 2008, after the calculations of how much he 
needed to dip into those retirement accounts in order to support the family, there 
was left over retirement amount of $79,483. For the year 2009, there was a left 
over amount of $70,799. In 2010 there was an amount of$37,813. That's a total 
of $116,096 that's retirement income that should be shared. Now the Court knows 
that the respondent's position is he spent all of that. But the fact is that to support 
the family in the way they were accustomed to be supported be did not need to 
spend that. He spent a lot of money on himself, on trips, on entertainment on 
doing things that were not by way of family expenses and so regardless of it 
supposedly having been spent already, the amount of retirement proceeds that 
should be equally divided from those years is $116,096. 
Respondent had control over that money, Petitioner has never had that. In 
addition he's got his Deseret Mutual Tax Sheltered Annuity Plan of $30,514 that 
needs to be figured into this. Thus we have $116,096, plus $30,514 for a total of 
$146,610. Divide that by two, he owes her $73,305. 
Looking at her side of the balance sheet, there is $50,896 in home equity 
under her control, She also bas a retirement account of approximately $10,000 in 
which he has an interest. That is a total of $60,896 divided by two she then O"l't'es 
him $30,448. Subtracting $30,448 from $73,305, he then owes her $42,857. The 
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Court should order that she be entitled to a QDRO to be prepared that she is 
entitled to 100% of the Desert Mutual Tax Sheltered Annuity Plan $30,514. 
Subtracting that from what he owes her of $42,857 that leaves a balance that he 
would owe her if she takes that retirement account of the sum $12,343. The Court 
should enter a judgment against him in the amount of $12,343 that he owes her for 
the difference in his retirement and her retirement and the home equify. 
13. Each parry should keep the personal properfy that they have in their 
possession. Each party shall retain their own bank accounts. Each parry shall pay 
their own debt, and the Petitioner, because she is awarded the home she is ordered 
to maintain the debt that is outstanding, that is owing to her sister and that which 
she owes the bank on the second mortgage. 
14. Regarding the issues of spousal support, the Petitioner has income from 
social security disability of $1,181 per month or $1,085 net. She states her 
monthly expenses as $2,585. Toe Court should reduce that somewhat finding that 
rent of $1,000 is not reasonable. Her actual payments are $584 per month. If in 
fact she needs to be paying something on the obligation to her sister, she has 
children living in the home that ought to be paying their fair share. The Court 
reduces her expenses by that $4 I 6 difference. In addition the utilities that she 
claims as expenses ought to be divided equally bet\veen her and her son and his 
family who live with her, which should reduce another $126.50 from her 
expenses. 1bis leaves a total the Court finds reasonable monthly expenses for her 
of $2,042.50. She has a net income of $1,085 to offset that; therefore she bas a 
need of $957.50. In addition the Court finds that $960 per month is that which she 
has need of in order to meet her reasonable monthly expenses. 
The Respondent as previously found is underemployed, however, the Court 
has imputed his income as $40,000 per year which is $3,333 per month. The 
Court finds that a reasonable net imputed income for him would be $2,666. 
Regarding his expenses, he has indicated on his financial statement that his 
monthly expenses are $3,677. He has listed there a $1,550 for installment 
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payments which the Court finds are not reasonable. The Court fmds that a 
reasonable payment on installments is $250. Certainly, it is not reasonable for 
almost half of his expenses to be on instailment payments, and he has some other 
things he could do about that. It is more important that he support his wife, than to 
take care of those other claims, however, the Court will allow him $250. He also 
twice counted telephone. He has a telephone expense of $100 and A TT $177. 
$100 is reasonable and since that is what she is given; therefore the Court subtracts 
his $177. It is also reasonable as done with the Petitioner, that only half of his 
utilities be counted and subtracting from that claimed, $152. Subtracting then the 
$1,300, the $177 and the $152 it results in his reasonable monthly expense of 
$1,948, and he then has the ability to pay $718 alimony. This does not quite meet 
the Petitioner's need, but he does not have the ability to pay more. However, at 
least, he has the ability to pay $700 per month, and the Court should award 
alimony to the Petitioner to be paid by the Respondent in the amount of $700 per 
month to begin January 1, 2012. 
15. The Respondent has a Vested Retirement Benefit from Deseret Mutual 
Master Retirement Plan under his Social Security Number 111111111 under 
which if he retires at age 65, he in May 2021, has Standard Retirement Benefit is 
$866.84 per month. The Petitioner should be awarded one-half of the monthly 
retirement payment, $433.42 per month as the monthly payment become due and 
payable. 
16. Regarding the issue of attorney's fees, clearly the Petitioner has a need, and 
she has no ability to pay attorney fees, however based on the standard that I have · 
to consider, the Respondent does not have the ability to pay her fees either. In 
actuality, she perhaps could liquidate some of the $30,000 in the retirement 
savings, although there would probably be a penalty. She, at least, has some 
ability to pay the attorney fees and be has no ability to pay her attorney fees. 
Therefore, the Court should order that each party pay their own attorney fees in 
this action. 
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From the foregoing Findings of Pact, the Court makes the following Conclusions 
ofLaw: 
1. GROlJNDS. The Petitioner should be granted a Decree of Divorce on the 
grounds of irreconcilable differences. 
2. REAL PROPERTY. The home property at 
should be awarded to Petitioner by inclusion in the Decree of 
Divorce with a legal description conveying the interest of the Respondent to the 
Petitioner subject to the indebtedness assumed by the Petitioner as set forth in the 
Findings of Fact. 
3. PERSONAL PROPERTY. Each party should be awarded the personal 
property now in possession oftbe party. 
4. PENSIONS AND RETIRE1v1ENT ACCOUNTS. 
a. The Petitioner should be awarded all of the interest of the Respondent in 
the Desert Mutual Tax Sheltered Annuity Plan for the Church of Jesus Christ 
retirement fund of about $30,500. A Qualified Domestic Relations Order pursuant 
to the requirement.s of the retirement plan should be executed awarding the entire 
interest of the Respondent in said plan to the Petitioner. 
b. The Petitioner is awarded a one-half interest in the Vested Retirement 
Benefit in the Deseret Mutual Master Retirement Plan now in the name of the 
Respondent when and as payable. 
c. The Petitioner should be granted judgment against Respondent for 
$12,343 for the amount owed to her in balancing the distribution of marital assets. 
5. DEBTS AND OBLIGATIONS. The parties should each be responsible for 
the debts and obligations incurred in their own names, except those owiI1g on the 
real property as a result of the first and second mortgages whlch the Petitioner 
should assume and discharge. The Respondent should pay his income tax 
liabilities for the year 2010 and thereafter. 
10 
r 
r 
• 
8 
I 
·-· -- . ··-· · · · ··· ····-·· .. ..... , . ... . ·,· -·--• · . .: .. · ---· . . ···- ·---··--· ........ . ; . . ...... __.. • ... ~~: .:.: .. ·, •• .;. ! • • ' ~ · " • • • • .:. . ... 
• • • :.-·.· • • ' ~ . . , · , •• ~·-• .>, 
,. .. 
1:: 
6. ALIMOl\1Y: The Petitioner should be awarded alimony in the sum of 
$700.00 per month payable beginning January 1, 2012. 
7. ATTORNEYS FEES: The Petitioner and Respondent should each pay their 
own attorney's fees and costs incurred in this action. 
Judgment should 1;,_e entered ac~ly. 
DATED th.is 2fl_ day of $ 2012 
BY THE COURT 
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GEORGE K. FADEL# l 027 
Attorney for Petitioner 
170 West 400 South n M \Ki~ 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 ~~ @ \Ki \J '.'.J 
(801) 295-2421 M/\R o 6 7.G \2 
Facsimile: (801) 294-778 
By--= 
IN TIIE SECOND DISTRJCT COURT IN AND FOR 
. , ~ :: .. ., :. : ;.; __ _________ .. 
FILED I MAR 2 0 2012 I 
SECOND 
DISTRICT COURT 
DA VIS COUNTY, F ARlvllNGTON DEPARTMENT, STA TE OF UTAH 
TANJA RODGERS RAYNER 
Petitioner, 
vs: 
PAUL T. RAYNER 
Respondent. 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
CASE NO: 10-470-1766 
JUDGE: Michael G. Allphin 
COMMISSIONER: David S. Dillon 
The above entitled cause came on regularly for trial before the Honorable 
Michael G. Allphin, District Judge after certification by the Commissioner to the 
District Court Judge, on December 28, 2011, and continued for further hearing on 
January 24, 2012. The Petitioner appeared in person and by Attorney George K. 
Fadel, and the Respondent appeared in person and by Attorney Steven R. 
Lawrence, Jr., at both of said hearings. The Court heard testimony provided by 
both parties together with other evidenc_e received in the cause and the Court 
having entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law now makes and enters 
the following: 
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DEGREE OF DIVORCE 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND DECREED: 
1. FINAL DIVORCE: The Petitioner is granted a decree of divorce from the 
Respondent on the grounds of irreconcilable differences of the marriage, the same 
to become final upon entry. 
2. REAL PROPERTY: The real property known as 
more particularly described as 
_, is hereby awarded to the 
Petitioner subject to encumbrances ofrecord, prior to January 24, 2012 free of any 
claim of the Respondent and those claiming by, through oi- under the Respondent. 
The recording of this Decree constitutes a conveyance, when recorded, vests title 
to the property in the Petitioner, Tanja Rodgers Rayner. 
3. PERSONAL PROPERTY: Each party is awarded the personal property 
now in possession of the party. 
4. PENSIONS AND RETJRE:tvIBNT ACCOUNTS: 
a. The Petitioner is awarded all of the interest of the Respondent in the 
Deseret Mutual Tax Sheltered Annuity Plan for the Church of Jesus Christ 
retirement fund of about $30,500. A Qualified Domestic Relations Order pursuant 
to the requirement of the retirement plan will be executed awarding the entire 
interest of the Respondent in said plan to the Petitioner. 
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b. The Petitioner is awarded a one-half interest in the Vested Retirement 
Benefit in the Deseret Mutual Master Retirement Plan now in the name of the 
Respondent when and as payable. 
c. The Petitioner is granted judgment against Respondent for $12,343 for 
the amount owed to her in balancing the distribution of marital assets. 
5. DEBTS AND OBLIGATIONS: The parties should each be responsible for 
the debts and obligations incurred as their own debt, except those owing on the 
real property as a result oftbe first and second mortgages which the Petitioner 
should assume and discharge. Credit card debt is the obligation of the signer on 
each credit card use. The Respondent shall pay his income tax liabilities for the 
year 2010 and thereafter. 
6. ALIMONY: The Petitioner is awarded alimony in the sum of$700.00 per 
month payable beginning January 1, 2012, by the Respondent. 
7. ATTORNEYS FEES: The Petitioner and Respondent are each to pay their 
own attorney's fees and costs incurred in this action. 
DATED this )_o ,:;:y of ~12 
BY THE COURT 
\. 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
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IN 11-IB SECOND DISTRICT COURT, DA VIS C 
STATE OF UTAH 
OCT 1 
y 
SECOND 
DISTRICT COURT 
TANJA RODGERS RAYNER 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
PAUL THOMAS RAYNER 
Respondent. 
SUPPLEMENTAL AND AMENDED 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Case No. 104701766 
Judge Michael G. Allphin 
This matter is before the Court on remand from the Utah Court of Appeals for the entry 
of more detailed findings of fact as to Respondent's employment capacity and earning potential 
for purposes of imputation of income and as to Respondent's dissipation of marital assets for 
purposes of the equitable division of the parties' marital estate. See Rayner v. Rayner, 2013 UT 
App 269, ~, 15 & 23-24, 316 P.3d 455. Following the remittitur, the Court required the parties to 
submit supplemental briefing on the remand issues. Having reviewed the evidence presented at 
trial and the parties' arguments at trial and within their supplemental briefing, the Court now 
enters the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, which supplement and amend its 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law entered on March 20, 2012: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
Respondent's employment capacity in the computer science field - employment history, 
abilities, limitations, qualifications, experience, and skills 
1. In 1983, Respondent received a Bachelor of Science Degree in the field of 
Computer Science from Brigham Young University. 
2. In 1989, Respondent received a Master of Science Degree in the field of 
Computer Science from Brigham Young University. 
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3. Respondent's employment from 1985 through April 2008, included work as a 
computer science teacher of Fortran programing and relational database theory classes at 
Brigham Young University, an on-site instructor of a 13-week relational database theory class 
for Blue Cross and Blue Shield Insurance Company, a seminar instructor for Oracle Rally in the 
Decus Seminars Program, and as a senior programmer for the Family History Department of the 
Corporation of the President of the LDS Church, which involved being the project lead to move 
the genealogical library catalog from an IMS database into a Unicode supported Oracle database 
and the project lead on the design and implementation of a database to track all worldwide 
contractual agreements of genealogical data. 
4. Respondent most recently worked, for approximately ten years, as a data 
warehousing instructor at Oracle Corporation. 
5. While working for Oracle Corporation, Respondent was the only person in the 
United States and Canada that possessed his particular skill set in computer programing and data 
warehousing, which required him to travel extensively throughout the country. 
6. While working for Oracle Corporation, Respondent was regularly in-state for only 
approximately 22 hours per week. 
7. On March 14, 2008, Respondent received a warning from Oracle Corporation 
regarding unsatisfactory performance, which indicated that his employment could be terminated 
if his performance did not immediate]y improve. 
8. In April 2008, Respondent either voluntarily left his employment at Oracle 
Corporation because he believed that his medical conditions would not permit improvement in 
his performance, or he was involuntarily terminated due to his unsatisfactory performance. 
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9. Respondent suffers from various permanent medical conditions, which have an 
effect on his ability to maintain high-stress and rigorous empl9yment and Jimit the use of his left 
hand. 
10. Respondent's testimony that his medical conditions prevent him from any 
continued employment in the computer science field is not credible. 
11. Given his education, the substantial timeframe in which he was employed in the 
computer science field, and the senior-level database warehousing and instructor positions he 
held in the computer science field, Respondent is highly qualified, experienced, and skilled in the 
computer science field. 
12. Despite his medical conditions, Respondent planned to obtain employment as an 
instructor or teacher in the computer science field following the termination of his employment 
at Oracle Corporation. 
13. Respondent further acknowledged that although his efficiency has decreased, be 
maintains a continued ability to use his left hand when typing on computer keyboards, and that 
the existence of voice-recognition software minimalizes the consequences of his left hand's 
limitations. 
14. Respondent has the abilities, qualifications, experience, and skills for continued 
employment in the computer science field as an instructor or teacher, or in some capacity in the 
design, implementation, and maintenance of databases and data warehousing. 
Respondent's earning potential - current earnings and historical earnings, prevailing 
wages, and reasonable availability of jobs 
15. Respondent's annual salary was $88,047 at the time of the termination of 
Respondent's employment at Oracle Corporation; this was also Respondent's average annual 
salary from 2003 through 2007. 
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16. Within one week after the termination of his employment at Oracle Corporation, 
Respondent was offered, but voluntarily declined, three full-time employment opportunities in 
the computer science field; each of these positions had an annual salary that ranged from $40,000 
to $50,000. 
17. Respondent's attempt to later clarify that he was not actually offered the three 
positions is not credible, as it conflicts with his prior testimony regarding the offers and the detail 
in which he discussed the offer from the school district in Nephi, Utah. 
18. The job offer Respondent received from the school district in Nephi involved the 
design and maintenance of a relatively small database,_which would have been less stressful and 
time-restrictive than Respondent's employment at Oracle Corporation, and which would have 
required only minimal maintenance. 
I 9. Given that the school district's database would have been relatively small and 
required only minimal maintenance, and in light of the position's annual salary, Respondent's 
travel from his Bountiful residence to Nephi would have been reasonable and his medical 
conditions would not have prevented the employment 
20. The three job offers Respondent received following the termination of his 
employment at Oracle Corporation, and particularly the offer from the school district in Nephi, 
are illustrative of reasonably available employment opportunities that Respondent was qualified 
for and had the ability to perform; the annual salaries for these positions are also illustrative of 
the prevailing earnings for persons of similar backgrounds in the community. 
21. Respondent also performed Internet job searches for employment in the computer 
science field following the termination of his employment at Oracle Corporation, and identified 
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several available full-time positions for which he was qualified, but he voluntarily chose not to 
submit applications for these positions. 
22. Given the amount oftime Respondent spent out-of-state during his employment at 
Oracle Corporation, and his subsequent travel to Delaware and other states, which he 
characterized as being for business purposes, Respondent' s testimony that he did not apply for 
available employment opportunities in the computer science field due to their requiring his 
relocation, or travel within or outside the state is not credible or reasonable. 
23. Additionally, despite the University of Utah reducing its number of teaching 
positions shortly after the termination of Respondent's employment at Oracle Corporation, 
Respondent was aware that part-time teaching positions in the computer science field were 
available from time to time at other schools and universities, such as the University of Phoenix; 
however, despite being qualified for these teaching positions and having the ability to perfonn 
these types of positions, Respondent voluntarily chose not to submit any applications for the 
positions. 
24. Given that Respondent planned to obtain an instructing or teaching position 
following the termination of his employment at Oracle Corporation, his· failure to submit any 
applications for available teaching positions in the computer science field is not reasonable. 
25. Ultimately, Respondent voluntarily chose to_ not submit any applications for 
employment in the computer science field, or any other field, after the termination of his 
employment at Oracle Corporation, and voluntarily chose not to put any effort, time, or financial 
resources into remaining current in his computer science expertise and training, despite having 
the financial resources and ability to do so. 
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26. Respondent's decision to not remain current in his computer science expertise and 
training following the termination of his employment at Oracle Corporation was not reasonable 
given his ability for continued employment in the wmputer science filed · and the reasonable 
availability of job opportunities of which he was aware. 
27. Rather than continuing his employment in the computer science field after the 
termination of his employment at Oracle Corporation, Respondent chose to focus on his 
involvement with a healthcare products company, Melaleuca, Inc., which he joined in 1988. 
28. Respondent's involvement with Melaleuca consists of hls informing people about 
Melaleuca's products in stores and other business establishments as the opportunities may arise 
while he performs his daily tasks. 
29. When an individual that Respondent refers to the Melaleuca website joins the 
company or purchases its products, Respondent receives a small commission, which varies in 
amount, but is generally between $2 and $5. 
30. Respondent earns on average $200 per month from Melaleuca commissions, and 
has earned approximately $18,000 from Melaleuca since he joined in 1988; Respondent also 
receives a discount on the Melaleuca products and services that he purchases as a result of his 
membershlp with the company. 
31. Given Respondent's education, work history and experience, qualifications, skills, 
and his continued ability to work in the computer science field, as well as considering the 
amount of income Respondent has earned from his involvement with Melaleuca and negligible 
time and efforts he makes to earn these commissions, Respondent's involvement with Melaleuca 
is not reasonable employment. 
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32. Respondent has not made reasonable efforts to obtain any employment since the 
termination of his employment at Oracle Corporation in April 2008. 
33. Based upon Respondent's continued ability to work in the computer science field, 
the reasonable availability of employment opportunities in the computer science field for which 
he is qualified and has the ability to perform, Respondent's decision to decline offers for 
reasonable employment in the computer science field and his failure to submit any applications 
for employment following the termination of his employment at Oracle Corporation, and that 
Respondent's involvement with Melaleuca is not reasonable employment, Respondent could be 
earning more with reasonable effort and is purposefully and voluntarily underemployed. 
34. Given Respondent's voluntary underemployment, and considering Respondent's 
historical income, which was $88,047 annually at the time of the termination of his employment 
at Oracle Corporation, Respondent's extensive experience and qualifications in the computer 
science field, that Respondent declined three job offers having annual salaries that ranged 
from $40,000 to $50,000, which are illustrative of the prevailing earnings for persons of similar 
backgrounds in the community and of the reasonable availability of employment opportunities 
for which Respondent was qualified for and had the ability to perform, it is appropriate and 
equitable to impute an annual income of $40,000 to Respondent. 
Respondent's dissipation of marital assets 
35. Respondent supported Petitioner financially through July 2010, making payments 
on the parties' marital home, utilities, and other related marita.1 .expenses; throughout the parties' 
marriage Petitioner also used her income to pay for daily household expenses, such as food and 
clothing. 
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36. Following the tennination of his employment at Oracle Corporation, 
in 2008, 2009, and 2010, Respondent liquidated his retirement funds, i.e., a retirement savings 
account, an IRA, and stocks, to pay for the parties' marital expenses and his individual expenses. 
37. Because all of Respondent's retirement funds were accumulated over the period 
of the parties' marriage, his retirement funds are marital assets of which Petitioner is entitled to a 
one-half share. 
38. The parties failed to present sufficient evidence to pennit a calculation of the 
exact amount of their monthly marital expenses in 2008, 2009, and 2010. 
39. However, for the five years preceding the termination of his employment at 
Oracle Corporation, Respondent earned an average annual salary of $88,047, which was 
sufficient to support himself and Petitioner and to pay for the parties' marital expenses and debts. 
40. Indeed, Respondent testified that prior to the termination of his employment at 
Oracle Corporation, the parties' monthly marital expenses were between $5,000 and $6,000, 
which is consistent with Petitioner's testimony that Respondent told her, and she believed, 
that $60,000 was the amount needed to support their lifestyle. 
4 I . Given that the parties historical expenditures and that they did not take on any 
significant new marital expenses or debts following the termination of Respondent's 
employment at Oracle Corporation, it is reasonable to infer that $88,047 annually was a 
sufficient amount to support Petitioner and Respondent and to pay for their marital expenses and 
debts in 2008, 2009, and 2010. 
42. Even considering the additional $16,000 debt resulting from Respondent's 
purchase of a vehicle for the parties' daughter, Respondent's testimony that the parties' marital 
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expenses rose to $10,000 per month following the termination of his employment at Oracle 
Corporation is not credible and is not supported by corroborating documentation. 
43 . . • In- 2008, prior to the termination of his employment at Oracle Corporation, , 
Respondent earned $62,307, which includes his severance pay. 
44. Considering $88,047 as the amount needed to support the parties and to pay for 
their marital expenses and debts in 2008, Respondent's actual 2008 income left a shortfall 
of $25,740 for 2008. 
45. In 2008, Respondent liquidated $105,223 of his stock, an amount that is $79,483 
greater than the shortfall needed to support the parties and to pay for their marital expenses and 
debts in 2008. 
46. Given the excess amount that Respondent liquidated from his retirement funds 
in 2008, there is an apparent dissipation of marital assets in the amount of $79,483 for 2008. 
47. Using $40,000 as Respondent's imputed income for 2009, and 
considering $88,047 as the amount needed to support the parties and to pay for their marital 
expenses and debts in 2009, there was a shortfall of $48,047 for 2009. 
48. In 2009, Respondent liquidated $37,787 of his stock and $81,059 from his IRA, 
for a total of $118,846, an amount that is $70,799 greater than the shortfall needed to support the 
parties and to pay for their marital expenses and debts in 2009. 
49. Given the excess amount that Respondent liquidated from his retirement funds 
in 2009, there is an apparent dissipation of marital assets in the amount of $70,799 for 2009. 
50. For 2010, Respondent supported Petitioner and paid for the parties' material 
expenses and debts for only the first seven months of the year; therefore, it is appropriate to 
reduce the $88,047 needed to support the parties and to pay for their marital expenses and debts 
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by the percentage ohime that Respondent actually provided family support in 2010, i.e., seven 
divided by twelve multiplied by $88,047, an amount that totals approximately $51,360. 
51. By reducing Respondent's $40,000 imputed income for 2010 by the percentage of 
time that Respondent actually provided family support in 2010, i.e., seven divided by twelve 
multiplied by $40,000, Respondent should have earned approximately $23,333 in the first seven 
months of 2010. 
52. Using $23,333 as Respondent's imputed income for the first seven months 
of 2010, and considering $51,360 as the amount needed to support the parties and to pay for their 
marital expenses and debts for the first seven months of 2010, there was a shortfall of $28,027 
for 2010. 
53. In 2010, Respondent liquidated $65,840 from his IRA, an amount that is $37,813 
greater than the shortfall needed to support the parties and to pay for their marital expenses and 
debts in 2010. 
54. Given the excess amount that Respondent liquidated from his retirement funds 
in 2010, there is an apparent dissipation of marital assets in the amount of $37,813 for 2010. 
55. The total amount of the apparent dissipation of marital assets for 2008, 2009, 
and 2010 is $188,095.1 
56. Because Respondent., and not Petitioner, had control over the amount that he 
liquidated from his retirement funds in 2008, 2009, and 2010, and because Respondent, and not 
Petitioner, bad primary control over and access to the liquidated retirement funds, it is 
1 In its March 20, 2012 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Court made a mathematical error when it 
calculated $116,096 as the total amount of the apparent dissipation of marital assets for 2008, 2009, and 2010. 
Accordingly, the Court amends its prior Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to reflect the correction of this 
clerical error and the use of the incorrect figure in the Court's subsequent calculations relating to the equitable 
division of the parties' marital estate. See Utah R. Civ. P. 60{a). 
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appropriate and equitable to attribute the apparent dissipation of marital assets for 2008, 2009, 
and 20 IO to Respondent 
57. Respondent's testimony that it was Petiti'6ner that dissipated these marital assets 
is not supported by the financial documentation and is not credible given that be had primary 
control over and access to the liquidated retirement funds. 
58. With the exception of $16,000 spent on the purchase of a vehicle for the parties' 
daughter, which Petitioner agreed to insofar as she believed that the purchase of a vehicle for 
their daughter was appropriate, Respondent has failed to present sufficient evidence to 
demonstrate that the apparent $188,095 of dissipated marital assets were actually used for some 
legitimate marital purpose. 
59. While there is insufficient evidence to show exactly how and where all of 
Respondent's liquidated retirement funds were spent, the financial documentation demonstrates 
that: 
• In November 2009 and April 2010, Respondent wrote checks totaling 
$1, I 00 to Richard Mathis; 
• In March 2010, Respondent purchased three season passes to Cedar 
Point, an amusement park in Sandusky, Ohio, for Respondent, the 
parties' daughter, and Mr. Mathis, which totaled $399; 
• From January 2008 through May 2010, Respondent spent $3,215.68 
on adult entertainment, including viewing potnography via the Internet 
and television, and frequenting private men's bathhouses, hotels, and 
adult themed boutiques and stores; 
• From May 2008 through May 2010, Respondent spent $498 for legal 
services from ARAG Legal Services; 
• From January 2008 through August 2010, Respondent made 
$19,743.51 in purchases ofMelaleuca products and services; and 
• From April 2008 through July 2010, Respondent spent $14,077.97 
while traveling to locations, including as Delaware, Pennsylvania, 
Nevada, and California 
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60. These expenditures, which Respondent made from his liquidated retirement 
funds, were not used for legitimate marital purposes and are illustrative of Respondent's 
dissipation of the parties' marital assets for his personal expenses that were above and beyond 
that of the parties' historical expenditures. 
61. Respondent's testimony that his expenditures of the liquidated retirement funds 
on Mr. Mathis were for the purpose of repaying loans that he used to pay marital expenses and 
debts is not credible nor is it supported by corroborating documentation. 
62. Respondent's testimony that his expenditures of the liquidated retirement funds 
for adult entertainment should be construed as being for legitimate marital purposes and were 
consistent with the parties' historical expenditures is not reasonable nor is it supported by 
corroborating documentation. 
63. Respondent's testimony that the amount of his expenditures of the liquidated 
retirement funds on Melaleuca products and services was consistent with the parties' historical 
expenditures is not credible nor supported by corroborating documentation. 
64. Respondent's testimony that his expenditures of the liquidated retirement funds 
while traveling should be construed as being for a legitimate marital purpose, i.e., business 
expenses, is not credible, as the primary purpose for Respondent's 11:'avel was for personal 
entertainment, such as spending time with Mr. Mathis or for adult entertainment, and as 
Respondent's involvement with Melaleuca was not reasonable employment. 
65. Given that Respondent spent the liquidated retirement funds on his personal 
expenses, and not for legitimate marital purposes, that these expenditures were not consistent 
with the parties' historical practices, that the dissipated marital assets comprise a substantial 
amount of the parties' marital estate, that Respondent had primary control over and access to the 
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liquidated retirement funds, and that Respondent failed to submit sufficient documentation to 
precisely account for how and where the liquidated retirement funds were spent, it is appropriate 
and equitable to hold Respondent·accountable for the entire amount of the dissipated marital 
assets. 
66. Subtracting the $16,000 spent on the purchase of a vehicle for the parties' 
daughter from the amount of the apparent dissipation of marital assets, $188,095, Respondent is 
accoW1table for $172,095 in dissipated marital assets for 2008, 2009, and 2010. 
67. In determining the appropriate division of the parties' marital estate, Respondent 
has $172,095 in dissipated marital assets and $30,514 from his Deseret Mutual Tax Sheltered 
Annuity Plan on his side of the balance sheet, which totals $202,609; dividing $202,609 by two 
results in Respondent owing Petitioner $101 ,304.50. 
68. On Petitioner's side of the balance sheet, she has $50,896 from equity in the 
parties' marital home and $10,000 from her retirement account, which totals $60,896; 
dividing $60,986 by two results in Petitioner owing Respondent $30,448. 
69. By subtracting the $30,448 that Petitioner owes to Respondent from 
the $101,304.50 that Respondent owes to Petitioner, there is a total of $70,856.50 that 
Respondent owes to Petitioner. 
70. It is, therefore, appropriate and equitable that a QDRO be prepared entitling 
Petitioner to 100% of Respondent's Deseret Mutual Tax Sheltered Annuity Pl~ $30,514, which 
leaves a balance of $40,342.50 that Respondent owes to Petitioner. 
71. Accordingly, it is appropriate and equitable that judgment be entered against 
Respondent and in favor of Petitioner in the amolli1t of$40,342.50. 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Respondent's voluntary underemployment 
1. Considering Respondent's employment capacity and employment · potential, 
Respondent has been voluntarily underemployed since the termination of his employment at 
Oracle Corporation in April 2008. See Busche v. Busche, 2012 UT App 16, ~~ 21-23, 272 
P.3d 748; see also Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018, 1026 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
Imputation of income to Respondent 
2. Given Respondent's voluntary underemployment, and considering hls 
employment potential, probable earnings, prevailing earnings for persons of similar backgrounds 
in the commun..ity, and the reasonable availability of employment opportunities for whlch 
Respondent is qualified and has the ability to perform, it is appropriate to impute an annual 
income of $40,000 to Respondent. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-12-203(7). 
Inclusion of dissipated marital assets in valuation of marital property 
3. Considering the historical amount necessary to support the parties and to pay for 
their marital expenses and debt, and the amount of the retirement funds that Respondent 
liquidated, there is an apparent dissipation of martial assets in the amount of $188,095 
for 2008, 2009, and 2010. 
4. Considering that Respondent had primary control over and access to the 
liquidated retirement funds, it is appropriate and equitable to attribute the apparent dissipation of 
marital assets for 2008, 2009, and 2010 to Respondent. 
5. Considering how Respondent spent the liquidated retirement funds, i.e., that 
Respondent used the funds for his personal expenses rather than legitimate marital purposes, the 
parties' historical practices and expenditures, the magnitude of the depletion in relation to the 
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size of the marital estate, and that Respondent failed to submit sufficient documentation to 
account for how and where the funds were spent, it is appropriate and equitable to hold 
Respondent accountable for the upper limit of the dissipated marital assets. See Goggin v. · 
Goggin, 2013 UT 16, ,i~ 49 & 53, 299 P.3d 1079; see also Parker v. Parker, 2000 UT 
App 30, ~ 15,996 P.2d 565; Shepherdv. Shepherd, 876 P.2d 429,433 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
6. Petitioner is entitled to a credit for her one-half share of the marital assets that 
Respondent dissipated. See Goggin, 2013 UT 16, ,i,i 49 & 53. 
7. It is appropriate and equitable that a QDRO be prepared entitling Petitioner 
to 100% of Respondent's Deseret Mutual Tax Sheltered Annuity Plan. 
8. It is appropriate and equitable that judgment be entered against Respondent and in 
favor of Petitioner in the amount of $40,342.50. 
ORDER 
Based upon the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Court' s March 20, 2012 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are supplemented and amended. 
The Court directs Petitioner to prepare and submit an Amended Decree of Divorce that 
incorporates and is consistent with the Court's March 20, 2012 Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law and these Supplemental and Amended Finding of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
Dated: ---1->--<l0'----1-'-'-· l 0--'-'==='"· 2DL-L-4-)1_ 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I certify that I sent a true and correct copy of the foregoing SUPPLEMENT AL 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER, postage pre-paid, to 
the following on this date: \O \ \C) \\\-\ 
George K. Fadel 
170 West 400 South 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
John M. Webster 
Matthew A. Bartlett 
BARTLETT & WEBSTER 
5093 South 1500 West 
Riverdale, Utah 84405 
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GEORGE K. FADEL #1027 
Attorney for Petitioner 
170 West 400 South 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
(801) 295-2421 
Facsimile: (80 l) 294-7787 
FILED 
JAN 2 6 2015 
SECOND 
DISTRICT COURT 
IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT IN AJ\TD FOR 
DA VIS COUNTY, FARMINGTON DEPARTMENT, STA TE OF UT AH 
TANJA RODGERS RAYNER 
Petitioner, 
vs: 
PAUL T. RAYNER 
Respondent. 
A.MENDED 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
CASENO: 10-470-1766 
JUDGE: Michael G. Allphin 
COMMISSIONER: David S. Dillon 
The above entitled cause came on regularly for trial before the Honorable 
Michael G. Allphin, District Judge after certification by the Commissioner to the 
District Court Judge, on December 28, 2011, and continued for further hearing on 
January 24, 2012. The Petitioner appeared in person and by Attorney George K. 
Fadel, and the Respondent appeared in person and by Attorney Steven R. 
Lawrence, Jr., at both of said hearings. The Court heard testimony provided by 
both parties together with other evidence received in the cause and the Court 
entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
• - •• u ••••••••••.• ••• • ~ .... ... -
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The Court, on remand from the Utah Court of Appeals for the entry of more 
detailed findings of fact as to Respondent's employment capacity and earning 
potential for purposes of imputation of income and as to Respondent's dissipation 
of marital assets for purposes of the equitable division of the parties' marital estate 
see Raynerv. Rayner, 2013 UT App 269, ~115 & 23-24, 316 P.3d 455, required 
the parties to submit supplemental briefing on the remand issues. Having reviewed 
the evidence presented at trial and the parties' arguments at trial and within their 
supplemental briefing, the Court entered Supplemental and AMENDED Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law, which supplement and amend its Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of law entered on March 20, 2012. 
The Court now makes and enters the following: 
AMENDED DEGREE OF DIVORCE 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND DECREED: 
1. FINAL DIVORCE: The Petitioner was granted a decree of divorce from the 
Respondent on the grounds of irreconcilable differences of the marriage, the same 
to become final upon entry, on March 20, 2012. 
2. REAL PROPERTY: The real property known as 
more particularly described as 
, is hereby awarded to the 
Petitioner subject to encumbrances of record, prior to January 24, 2012 free of any 
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claim of the Respondent and those claiming by, through or under the Respondent. 
The recording of this Decree constitutes a conveyance, when recorded, vests title to 
the property in the Petitioner, Tanja Rodgers Rayner. 
3. PERSONAL PROPERTY: Each party is awarded the personal property in 
possession of the party on March 20, 2012. 
4. PENSIONS AND RETIREMENT ACCOUNTS: 
a. The Petitioner is awarded all of the interest of the Respondent in the 
Deseret Mutual Tax Sheltered Annuity Plan for the Church of Jesus Christ 
retirement fund of about $30,500. A Qualified Domestic Relations Order pursuant 
to the requirement of the retirement plan will be executed awarding the entire 
interest of the Respondent in said plan to the Petitioner. 
b. The Petitioner is awarded a one-half interest in the Vested Retirement 
B~nefit in the Deseret Mutual Master Retirement Plan now in the name of the 
Respondent when and as payable. 
c. The Petitioner is granted judgment against Respondent for $40,342.50 for 
the amount owed to her in balancing the distribution of marital assets. 
5. DEBTS AND OBLIGATIONS: The parties should each be responsible for 
the debts and obligations incurred as their own debt, except those owing on the real 
property as a result of the first and second mortgages which the Petitioner should 
assume and discharge. Credit card debt is the obligation of the signer on each 
credit card use. The Respondent shall pay his income tax liabilities for the year 
2010 and thereafter. 
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6. ALIMONY: The Petitioner is awarded alimony in the sum of $700.00 per 
month payable beginning January 1, 2012, by the Respondent. 
7. ATTORNEYS FEES: The Petitioner and Respondent are each to pay their 
own attorney's fees and costs incurred in this action. 
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§ 30-3-5. Disposition of property--Maintenance and health care of ... , UT ST § 30-3-5 
KeyCite Yellow Flag - Negative Trcaunent 
Proposed Legislation 
\Vest's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 30. Husband and \Vife 
Chapter 3. Divorce (Refs & Annos) 
U.C.A. 1953 § 30-3-5 
§ 30-3-5. Disposition of property--Maintenance and health care of parties and 
c.hildren--Division of debts--Comt to have continuingjurisdiction--Custody and 
parent-time--Determination of alimony--Nonmeritorious petition for modification 
Currentness 
(J ) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include in it equitable orders re lating to the children, property, debts 
or obligations, and parties. The court shall include the following in every decree of divorce: 
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the payment of reasonable and necessary medical and dental expenses of the 
dependent children including responsibility for heal th insurance out-of-pocket expenses such as co-payments, co-insurance, 
and deductibles; 
(b )(i) if coverage is or becomes available at a reasonable cost, an order requiring the purchase and maintenance of appropriate 
health, hospital, and dental care insurance for the dependent children; and 
(ii) a designation of which health, hospital, or dental insurance plan is primary and which health, hospital, or dental 
insurance plan is secondary in accordance with the provisions of Section 30-3-5.4 which will take effect if at any time a 
dependent child is covered by both parents' health , hospital, or dental insurance plans; 
(c) pursuant to Section l 5-4-6.5: 
(i) an order specifying which party is responsible for the payment of joint debts, obligations, or liabilities of the parties 
contracted or incurred during marriage; 
(ii) an order requiring the parties to notify respective creditors or obligees, regarding the court's division of debts, 
obligations, or liabilities and regarding the parties' separate, current addresses; and 
(iii) provisions for the enforcement of these orders; 
(d) provisions for income withholding in accordance with Title 62A, Chapter 11 , Recovery Services; and 
- --- ------ --- ·---------
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§ 30-3-5. Disposi tion of property--Maintenance and health care of ... , UT ST § 30-3-5 
(e) if either pa1ty owns a life insurance policy or an annuity contract, an acknowledgment by the court that the owner: 
(i) bas reviewed and updated, where appropriate, the list of beneficiaries; 
(ii) has affirmed that those listed as beneficiaries are in fact the intended beneficiaries after the divorce becomes final; and 
(iii) understands that if no changes are made to the policy or contract, the beneficiaries currently listed will receive any 
funds paid by the insurance company under the terms of the policy or contract. 
(2) The court may include, in an order determining child support, an order assigning financial responsibility for all or a portion 
of child care expenses incurred on behalf of the dependent chi ldren, necessitated by the employment or training of the custodial 
parent. lfthe court detennines that the circumstances are appropriate and that the dependent children would be adequately cared 
for, it may include an order allowing the noncustodial parent to provide child care for the dependent children, necessitated by 
the employment or training of the custodial parent. 
(3) The court bas continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or new orders for the custody of the children and their 
support, maintenance, health, and dental care, and for distribution of the property and obligations for debts as is reasonable 
and necessary. 
(4) Child support, cusiody, visitation, and other matters related to children born to the mother and father after entry of the decree 
of divorce may be added to the decree by modification. 
(5)(a) In determining parent-time rights of parents and visitation rights of grandparents and other members of the immediate 
family, the court shall consider the best interest of the chi ld. 
(b) Upon a specific finding by the court of the need for peace officer enforcement, the court may include in an order 
establishing a parent-time or visitation schedule a provision, among other things, authorizing any peace officer to enforce a 
court-ordered parent-time or visitation schedule entered under this chapter. 
(6) If a petition for modification of child custody or parent-time provisions of a court order is made and denied, the court shall 
order the petitioner to pay the reasonable attorneys' fees expended by the prevailing party in that action, iftbe court determines 
that the petition was without meri t and not asserted or defended against in good faith. 
(7) If a petition alleges noncompliance with a parent-time order by a parent, or a visitation order by a grandparent or other 
member of the immediate family where a visitation or parent-time right has been previously granted by the court, the court may 
award to the prevailing party costs, including actual attorney fees and court costs incurred by the prevailing party because of 
the other party's failure to provide or exercise court-ordered visitation or parent-time. 
(8)(a) The court shall consider at least the following factors in determining alimony: 
-----··---- ·--·-----~---------------------
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§ 30-3-5. Disposition of property--Maintenance and health care of ... , UT ST§ 30-3-5 
(i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse; 
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce income; 
(iii) the ability oftbe payor spouse to provide support; 
(iv) the length oftbe maniage; 
(v) whether the recipient spouse bas custody of minor children requiring support; 
(vi) whether the recipient spouse worked in a business owned or operated by the payor spouse; and 
(vii) whether the recipient spouse directly contributed to any increase in the payor spouse's skill by paying for education 
received by the payor spouse or enabling the payor spouse to attend school duril1g the maniage. 
(b) The court may consider the fault of the parties in determining whether to award alimony and the terms thereof. 
(c) "Fault" means any of the following wrongful conduct during the marriage that substantially contributed to the break.'11p 
of the maniage relationship: 
(i) engaging in sexual relations with a person other than the party's spouse; 
(ii) knowingly and intentionally causing or attempting to cause physical harm to the other party or minor children; 
(iii) knowingly and intentionally causing the other party or minor children to reasonably fear life-threatening harm; or 
(iv) substantially undermining the financial stability oftbe other party or the minor children. 
(d) The court may, when fault is at issue, close the proceedings and seal the court records. 
( e) As a general rule, the court should look to the standard ofliving, existing at the time of separation, in detennining alimony 
in accordance with Subsection (8)(a). However, the court shaU consider all relevant facts and equitable principles and may, 
in its discretion, base alimony on the standard of living that existed at the time of trial. In maniages of short duration, when 
no children have been conceived or born during the marriage, the court may consider the standard of living that existed at 
the time of the maniage. 
(f) The court may, under appropriate circumstances, attempt to equalize the parties' respective standards of living. 
- ----- ···------- - ------
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§ 30-3-5. Disposition of property--Maintenance and health care of ... , UT ST§ 30-3-5 
(g) When a marriage of long duration dissolves on the threshold of a major change in the income of one of ibe spouses 
due to the collective efforts of both, that change shall be considered in dividing the marital property and in determining the 
amount of alimony. lf one spouse's earning capacity bas been greatly enhanced through the efforts of both spouses during 
the marriage, the cow1 may make a compensating adjustment in dividing the mari tal property and awarding alimony. 
(h) In detem1ining al imony when a marriage of short duration dissolves, and no children have been conceived or born during 
the marriage, the cow1 may consider restoring each party to the condition which existed at the time of the marriage. 
(i)(i) The cow1 has continuing jurisdiction to make substantive changes and new orders regarding alimony based on a 
substantial material change in circumstances not foreseeable at the time of the divorce. 
(ii) The court may not modify a limony or issue a new order for alimony to address needs of the recipient that did not exist 
at the time the decree was entered, unless the court finds extenuating circumstances that justify that action. 
(iii) In detem1ining alimony, the income of any subsequent spouse of the payor may not be considered, except as provided 
in this Subsection (8). 
(A) The court may consider the subsequent spouse's financial ability to share living expenses. 
(B) The court may consider the income of a subsequent spouse if the court finds that the payor's improper conduct 
justifies that consideration. 
(j) Alimony may not be ordered for a duration longer than the number of years that the marriage existed unless, at any time 
prior to termination of alimony, the court finds extenuating circumstances that justify the payment of alimony for a longer 
period of time. 
(9) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides otherwise, any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse 
automatically terminates upon the remarriage or death of that former spouse. However, iftbe remarriage is annulled and found 
to be void ab initio, payment of alimony shall resume if the party paying alimony is made a party to the action of annulment 
and the payor party's rights are determined. 
(I 0) Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse terminates upon establishment by the party paying 
alimony that the former spouse is cohabitating with another person. 
Credits 
Laws 1909, c. 109, § 4; Laws 1969, c. 72, § 3; Laws 1975, c. 81, § I ; Laws 1979, c. 110, § l ; Laws 1984, c. 13, § l ; Laws 
1985, c. 72, § 1; Laws 1985, c. 100, § 1; Laws 1991, c. 257, § 4; Laws 1993, c. 152, § I; Laws 1993, c. 261, § 1; Laws 1994, 
c. 284, § l; Laws 1995, c. 330, § 1, eff. May 1, 1995; Laws 1997, c. 232, § 4, eff. July 1, 1997; Laws 1999, c. 168, § I , eff. 
May 3, 1999; Laws 1999, c. 277, § 1, eff. May 3, 1999; Laws 2001, c. 255, § 4, eff. April 30, 2001; Laws 2003, c. 176, § 3, 
eff. May 5, 2003; Laws 2005, c. 129, § 1, eff. May 2, 2005; Laws 2010, c. 285, § I , eff. May 11 , 201 0; Laws 2013, c. 264, § 
I, eff. May 14, 2013; Laws 2013, c. 373, § I , eff. May 14, 2013. 
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Codifications R.S. 1898, § 1212; C.L. 1907, § 12 12; C.L. 1917, § 3000; R.S. l 933, § 40-3-5; C. 1943, § 40-3-5. 
Notes of Decisions (1479) 
. _UC.A. 1953 § 30-3-5, :UT ST§ 30-3-5 
.;- . -- .. 
Current through 2015 First Special Session 
End of Document © 20 i 5 Thomson Reuters. "Ko claim to original FS. Government Worb. 
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§ 78B-12-203. Determination of gross income--lmputed income, UT ST§ 78B-12-203 
West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 78b. Judicial Code 
Chapter 12. Utah Child Support Act (Refs & Annos) 
Part 2. Calculation and Adjustment 
U.C.A. 1953 § 78B-12-203 
Formerly cited as UT ST §78-45-7.5 
§ 78B-12-203. Determination of gross income--Imputed income 
Currentness 
(I) As used in the guidelines, "gross income" includes prospective income from any source, including earned and nonearned 
income sources which may include salaries, wages, commissions, royalties, bonuses, rents, gifts from anyone, prizes, dividends, 
severance pay, pensions, inierest, trust income, -alimony from previous marriages, annuities, capital gains, Social Security 
benefits, workers' compensation ben.efits, unemployment compensation, income replacement disability insurance benefits, and 
payments from "nonmeans-tested" government programs. 
(2) Income from earned income sources is limited to the equivalent of one full-time 40-hour job. If and only if during the time 
prior to the miginal support order, the parent normally and consistently worked more than 40 hours at the parent's job, the court 
may consider this extra time as a pattern in calculating the parent's ability to provide child support. 
(3) Notwithstanding Subsection (I), specifically excluded from gross income are: 
(a) cash assistance provided under Title 35A, Chapter 3, Part 3, Fami ly Employment Program; 
(b) benefits received under a housing subsidy program, the Job Training Partnership Act, Supplemental Security Income, 
Social Security Disability Insurance, Medicaid, SNAP benefits, or General Assistance; and 
(c) other similar means-tested welfare benefits received by a parent. 
(4)(a) Gross income from self-employment or operation of a business shall be calculated by subtracting necessary expenses 
required for self-employment or business operation from gross receipts. The income and expenses from self-employment or 
operation of a business shall be reviewed to determine an appropriate level of gross income available to the parent to satisfy 
a child support award. Only those expenses necessary to allow the business to operate at a reasonable level may be deducted 
from gross receipts. 
(b) Gross income determined under this subsection may differ from the amount of business income determined for tax 
purposes. 
(5)(a) When possible, gross income should first be computed on an annual basis and then recalculated to determine the average 
gross monthly income. 
··-··- ------- --
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§ 78B-12-203. Determination of gross income--lmputed income, UT ST§ 788-12-203 
(b) Each parent shall provide verification of current income. Each parent shall provide year-to-date pay stubs or employer 
statements and complete copies of tax returns from at least the most recent year unless the court finds the verification is 
not reasonably available. Verification of income from records maintained by the Department of Worl--force Services may be 
substituted for pay stubs, employer statements, and income tax returns. 
(c) Historical and current earnings shall be used to determine whether an underemployment or overemployment situation 
exists. 
(6) Gross income includes income imputed to the parent under Subsection (7). 
(7)(a) Income may not be imputed to a parent unless the parent stipulates to the amount imputed, the parent defaults, OL in 
contested cases, a hearing is held and the judge in a judicial proceeding or the presiding officer in an administrative proceeding 
enters findings of fact as to the evidentiary basis for tl1e imputation. 
(b) If income is imputed to a parent, the income shall be based upon employment potential and probable earnings as derived 
from employment opportunities, work history, occupation qualifications, and prevailing earnings for persons of similar 
backgrounds in the community, or the median earning for persons in the same occupation in the same geographical area as 
found in the statistics maintained by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
(c) If a parent has no recent work history or a parent's occupation is unknown, income shall be imputed at least at the federal 
minimum wage for a 40-hour work week. To impute a greater income, the judge in a judicial proceeding or the presiding 
officer in an administrative proceeding shall enter specific findings of fact as to the evidentiary basis for the imputation. 
(d) Income may not be imputed if any of the following conditions exist and ilie condition is not of a temporary nature: 
(i) ilie reasonable costs of child care for the parents' minor children approach or equal the amount of income the custodial 
parent can earn; 
(ii) a parent is physically or mentally unable to earn minimum wage; 
(iii) a parent is engaged in career or occupational training to establish basic job ski lls; or 
(iv) unusual emotional or physical needs of a child require the custodial parent's presence in the home. 
(8)(a) Gross income may not include tbe earnings of a minor child who is fue subject of a child support award nor benefits to 
a minor child in the child's own right such as Supplemental Security Income. 
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(b) Social Security benefits received by a child due to the earnings of a parent shall be credited as child support to the parent 
upon whose earning record it is based, by crediting tbe amount against the potential obligation of that parent. Other unearned 
income of a child may be considered as income to a parent depending upon the circumstances of each case. 
Credits 
Laws 2008, c. 3, § I 245, eff. Feb. 7, 2008; Laws 2012, c. 41 , § 13, eff. May 8, 2012. 
Notes of Decisions (68) 
UC.A. 1953 § 78B- l 2-203, UT ST§ 78B-l 2-203 
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Synopsis 
Background: Wife filed a petition for divorce. The Second 
District Court, Farmington Depanrnent, Michael G. Allphin, 
J., distributed property, awarded wife atimooy, and granted 
the divorce. Husband appealed. 
Holdings: The Court of Appeals, Christiansen, J., held that: 
[l) the Court of Appeals was unable to review husband's 
appellate argument that alleged the trial court erred when it 
found he was voluntarily underemployed and imputed income 
to husband, and 
[2) the Court of Appeals was unable to review husband's 
appellate argument that alleged the trial court erred when it 
found be bad dissipated marital assets . 
Reversed and remanded. 
Attorneys and Law Firms 
*457 John M. Webster, for Appellant. 
George K. Fadel, Bountiful, for Appellee. 
Judge MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN authored this 
Opinion, in which Judges GREGORY K. OR.ME and J. 
FREDERIC VOROS JR. concurred. 
Opinion 
CHRISTIANSEN, Judge: 
,i 1 Paul Thomas Rayner (Husband) appeals the trial court's 
decree of divorce, challenging the trial court's property 
distribution and alimony award. We reverse and remand. 
------·------------------
BACKGROUND 
,i 2 Tanja Rodgers Rayner (Wife) and Husband were married 
in 1981. They separated nearly thirty years later in January 
20 I 0, and Wife filed a petition for divorce later that year. 
Husband had lost his job in April 2008. After losi_ng his job, 
he received only minimal income working with a multi-level 
marketing firm. However, Husband and Wife had stock and 
multiple retirement accounts, and Husband began liquidating 
some of these assets after he lost his job and continued to do 
so during the parties' separation. 
,i 3 After a bench trial, the trial court found Husband to 
be underemployed and imputed to him an annual income 
of S40,000. The trial court· also found that Husband had 
dissipated the parties' assets, spending SI I 6,096 "on himself' 
during 2008, 2009, and 2010. 1 The imputed income and 
the dissipated assets factored into the trial court's ultimate 
alimony award and property distribution that accompanied 
the decree of divorce. 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
r 11 [2) (3) ,i 4 On appeal, Husband contends that the 
trial court exceeded its discretion by misapplying the law 
and that its findings of underemployment and dissipation 
are not supported by the evidence. "The trial court *458 
in a divorce action is permitted considerable discretion in 
adjusting the financial and property interests of the parties, 
and its actions are entitled to a presumption of validi ty." 
Goggin v. Goggin, 2013 UT J 6, "ii 44,299 P.3d J 079 (citation 
and internal quotation marks omitted). However, we will 
reverse if"( J) there was a misunderstanding or misapplication 
of the law resulting in substantial and prejudicial error; (2) 
the evidence clearly preponderated against the finding; or (3) 
such a serious inequity has resulted as to manifest a clear 
abuse of discretion." Id. ( citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted). Furthermore, "we cannot affirm its determination 
when the trial court abuses its discretion" by failing to 
enter "specific, detailed findings supporting its financial 
determinations." Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018, 1021 (Utah 
Ct.App.1993 ). 
ANALYSIS 
·----- ··-·----------
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I. Imputed Income 
1_4) ~ 5 Husband first contends that the trial court's finding 
of voluntary underemployment was unsupported by the 
evidence. The trial court stated that the evidence concerning 
whether Husband quit or was fired for cause was u.nclear. 
Therefore, the trial court's finding of underemployment 
focused oo Husband's actions after losing his job. The trial 
court fouod that at the time his job ended io April 2008, 
Husband had an aonual salary of about S88,000. Husband 
"initially made an attempt to fiod another job." He was 
"offered a job" in Nephi for about $40,000 a year, but "he 
turned that down" because "he didn't want to move" from bis 
home in Bountiful. After his initial efforts, Husband "didn't 
make any other efforts to find employment." The trial court 
also found that Husband "has the ability to work regardless 
of the health concerns that be has." The trial court found that 
the "few hundred dollars a year" that Husband made from 
bis multi-level marketing work-"and sometimes go [iog) in 
the hole"--did oot qualify as reasonable employment. Based 
on Husband's education and abi lity, aod the availability of 
the job in Nephi, the trial court concluded that Husband was 
underemployed. 
ii 6 Husband argues that no evidence supports these findings. 
He argues that the uncontroverted evidence instead requires 
the conclusion that be was fired for cause, that he was not 
actually offered the job in Nephi, that moving or commuting 
to Nephi was oot an option, that his numerous health problems 
prevent him from working a rigorous schedule or using his 
left hand, and that his multi-level marketing work provided a 
viable source of income given his health restrictions. 
[5) [6) ~ 7 "When determining the appropriate amount of 
alimony, a trial court must make findings as to 'the ability 
of the payor spouse to provide support.' "Fish v. Fish, 20 JO 
UT App 292, ~ 14, 242 P.3d 787 (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 
30- 3- 5(8)(a)(iii) (LexisNexis Supp.2010)). "In doing so, '[a) 
court may impute income to an underemployed spouse.' "Id. 
( alteration in original) ( quoting Connell v. Connell, 2010 UT 
App 139, ~ 16,233 P.3d 836). " [T)he imputation analysis ... 
involves determining whether the [spouse) is voluntarily 
unemployed or underemployed and, if so, how much income 
ought to be imputed." Busche v. Busche, 2012 UT App 16, 
~ l 3, 272 P.3d 748. A spouse is " 'voluntarily uoemployed 
or underemployed' when [he or she) intentionally chooses 
of his or her own free will to become unemployed or 
undc-:remployed." Jd. ~ 16 (alteration in original) (citation and 
additional internal quotation marks omitted). 
~ 8 lo Busche, we recen tly explained what is required under 
the first step of the imputation analysis to support a finding 
of voluntary u.nderemployment following the loss ofajob. lf 
the trial court detem1ines that a spouse has been involuntarily 
tem1inated, the trial court "must then consider what the 
[spouse) has done in the aftermath of termination to determine 
whether he or she has become voluntarily underemployed 
by virtue of his or her fai lure to theo make reasonable 
efforts to obtain employment at a pay rate comparable 
to that of the lost employment." Id. ~ 21. In addition to 
considering the spouse's efforts, the trial court must consider 
the spouse's "employment capacity and earnings potential." 
Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018, 1026 (Utah Ct.App.1993). 
Employment capacity *459 involves consideration of the 
spouse's abilities and limitations, qualifications, experience, 
and skills. Busche, 20 12 UT App 16, ,1,J 21-22, 272 P.3d 748; 
Hall, 858 P.2d at 1026. An earning potential detem1ination 
involves comparison of the spouse's current earnings with 
ms or her historical income, "the prevailing wages for a 
person with his or her qualifications" and consideration of 
whether there are jobs reasonably avai lable "in the relevant 
market for a person with the party's qualifications and 
experience." Busche, 2012 UT App 16, ~~ 21-23, 272 P.3d 
748; Hall, 858 P .2d at 1026. In sum, "a finding of volunta1y 
underemployment must be based on evidence that the party 
could be earning more with reasonable effort." Busche, 2012 
UT App 16, ~ 22, 272 P.3d 748. 
[7) ~ 9 "Should the court determine that the petitioner 
is indeed voluntarily underemployed and that imputation is 
appropriate under the circumstances, it may then proceed to 
refine the analysis to arrive at a specific amount of income to 
be imputed." Jd. ii 23. Under this second step of the analysis, 
the trial court must consider the folJowiog statutory factors, 
which "closely align" with the analysis uoder the first step: 
If income is imputed to a 
[spouse), the income shall be 
based upon employment potential 
and probable earnings as derived 
from employment opportunities, work 
history, occupation qualifications, 
and prevai ling earnings for persons 
of similar backgrounds m the 
community, or the median earning for 
persons in the same occupation in the 
same geographical area as found in the 
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statistics maintained by the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-12-203(7)(b) (LexisNexis 2012). 2 
I 8] [9] ,i IO The Utah Code states that in contested cases, 
"[i]ncome may not be imputed to a [spouse] unless . . . a 
bearing is held and the judge ... enters findings of fact as 
to the evidentiary basis for the imputation." Id. § 78B-J 2-
203(7)(a). This statute was amended in 2007 and renumbered 
in 2008. 3 The prior version stated that in contested cases, 
"[i]ncome may not be imputed to a [spouse] unless ... a 
hearing is held and a finding made that the [spouse) is 
voluntari ly unemployed or underemployed." Id. § 78-45-
7.5(7)(a) (Supp.2006). 4 By replacing the language requiring 
"a finding : .. that the [spouse] is voluntari ly unemployed 
or underemployed," id., with lanwa2e requirino the J·udoe 
.::, ._, 0 .::,, 
to "enter[ ] fmdings of fact as to the evidentiary basis for 
the imputation," id. § 78B-l2-203(7)(a) (2012), we read 
the statute as emphasizing the detailed findings of fact 
necessary to support a decision to impute income, as well 
as implicitly recognizing that whether a party is voluntarily 
underemployed or unemployed is really an ultimate fact 
or a legal conclusion which turns on the subsidiary facts 
found by tl1e trial court. "Imputation is troubling when the 
obligor is charged with obligations that he may not be 
able to pay, even with the best of efforts." Busche, 2012 
UT App 16, ,i 17, 272 P.3d 748 (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted). Indeed, in the alimony context, 
the imputation analysis is a component of determining the 
obligor's ability to pay and the recipient spouse's ability to 
support himself or herself. Fish, 2010 UT App 292, ,i,i 14, 
22, 242 P.3d 787; *460 Willey v. Willey, 866 P.2d 547, 
554 (Utah Ct.App.1993 ). Imputation "cannot be premised 
upon mere conjecture; instead, it demands a careful and 
precise assessment requiring detailed findings." Willey, 866 
P.2d at 554. Therefore, the trial court must enter not just a 
finding of voluntary unemployment or underemployment but 
specific, detailed findings "as to the evideotiary basis for the 
imputation," Utah Code Ann. § 78B-12-203(7)(a). See Fish, 
20 IO UT App 292, ,i,i 20, 22, 242 P.3d 787 (remanding for 
additional findings on whether income should be imputed 
and bow much); Willey, 866 P.2d at 554 (same); Hall, 858 
P.2d at 1024-27 (same). But see Mancil v. Smi1h, 2000 UT 
App 3 78, ,ii] 20-21, 18 P.3d 509 (stating, in considering the 
prior version of the statute, that requiring the trial court to 
make "explicit findings on each of the factors" "is too strict" 
a reading of the statute, at least when the findings can be 
necessarily implied or are based on undisputed evidence). 
[10] fll] [12) [13] ,i 11 "Findings are adequate only if 
they are sufficiently detailed and include enough subsidiary 
facts to disclose the steps by which the ultimate conclusion 
on each factual issue was reached." Hall, 858 P .2d at J 02 J 
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted); accord Fish, 
2010 UT App 292, ,i 20, 242 P.3d 787. 'T he trial court's 
decision to impute income may nonetheless be affirmed if 
the failure to have made the missing findings can be viewed 
as hamlless error." Hall, 858 P.2d at 1025. "One method 
is to show that the undisputed evidence clearly establishes 
tbe factor or factors on which findings are missing." Id. 
( citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also 
Mancil, 2000 UT App 378, ,i 21 , 18 P.3d 509 (concluding 
that specific findings on the statutory imputation factors 
were not necessary when the evidence was not in dispute). 
"Furthermore, even given controverted evidence, we could 
affirm the trial court's decision to impute income, absent 
outright expression of the statutorily mandated finding. if 
the absent findings can reasonably be implied." Hall, ~858 
P.2d at 1025. "Unstated findings can be implied if it is 
reasonable to assume that the trial court actually considered 
the controverted evidence and necessari ly made a finding to 
resolve the controversy, but simply failed to record the factual 
determination it made." Id.; see Reese v. Reese, 1999 UT 75 ~ I 5, 984 P.2d 987 (determining that some of the staruto; 
factors required in the imputation analysis were "necessarily 
implied" by the evidence). "Findings may not be implied, 
however, wben the ambiguity of tbe facts makes such an 
assumption unreasonable." Hall, 858 P.2d at 1025 (citation 
and internal quotation marks omitted). For example, "we will 
not imply any missing finding where there is a matrix of 
possible factual findings and we cannot ascertain the trial 
court's actual findings." Id. at I 025-26 (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
,i 12 Husband argues both that the evidence was insufficient 
to support the underemployment determination and that the 
trial court abused its discretion by disregarding the imputation 
analysis required by Busche and the statute. However, we are 
unable to review Husband's arguments due to the inadequacy 
of the trial court's findings. " '[W]here the inadequacy of the 
trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law results in 
our inability to ascertain the basis of the trial court's decision 
[ we are] prevented from effectively reviewing the trial court'; 
decision and may remand for the entry of more-detailed 
findings.'" Allen v. Ciokewicz, 2012 UT App J 62, ~ 42, 280 
P .3d 425 (second alteration in original) (quoting Interstate 
- - - ··---·---.. ----------- ·-------------
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Income Props., Inc. v. la Jolla Loans, Inc., 20 11 UT App l 88, 
,i J 2, 257 P.3d l 073). We fol low that course here. 
,i 13 \\le cannot say that "the undisputed evidence clearly 
establishes the factor or factors on wbjch findings are 
missing." See Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018, 1025 (Utah 
Ct.App.1993). Nor can we reasonably infer tbe missing 
findings from tbe record before us. See id. The trial court 
included findings on Husband's mirumal efforts to search 
for a job following his termination and Husband's ultimate 
decision to work with a low-paying multi-level marketing 
company. However, tbe trial court's findings of Husband's 
employment capacity are sparse. It stated that Husband had 
degrees "in the computer field" and had the ability to work 
"regardless of the health concerns that he has." Extensive 
evidence was presented at trial that Husband suffered from 
significant health problems *461 that prevented him from 
maintaining rigorous or stressful employment or employment 
with a restrictive schedule. The only contradictory testimony 
provided at trial was that Wife saw Husband doing physical 
labor in March 201 I . The trial court may have determined 
that Husband's testimony was not credible. On tbe other hand, 
it could have concluded that the testimony was credible but 
that the health limitations did not preclude certain types of 
employment in the fields of computers or teaching, in which 
he had previously worked. The trial court never identified 
which types of employment for wruch Husband was qualified 
and able to do. 
,i 14 Tbe trial court's findings on earning potential are equally 
sparse. The trial court stated that Husband, who lived with 
Wife in Bountiful at the time, was offered a job in Nephi. 
Although Husband did testify that he was offered a few jobs, 
including the one in Nephi, be later clarified in response to 
further questioning by the trial court that be bad discussed 
the jobs with potential employers but did not apply and 
was not actually offered any jobs. He also testified that be 
considered teaching computer science but that the University 
of Utah was not hiring, and while the Uruversity of Phoenix 
occasionally had part-time positions available, the pay was 
too low. In its findings, the trial court mentioned only the job 
in Nephi, and it discussed the job in Nepru in the context of 
Husband's job search efforts and in calculating the amount 
of salary to impute. The trial court never entered a finding 
as to whether the job in Nephj was reasonably available in 
spite of the distance from Husband's home and Husband's 
health limitations or, alternatively, whether it was merely 
illustrative of jobs likely to be available to Husband in other 
areas of Utah. Nor did the trial court determine whether 
other appropriate jobs were reasonably available. Finally, the 
trial court never stated that Husband's underemployment was 
voluntary. 
,i 15 While the trial court's subsidiary findings on Husband's 
job search efforts may contribute to a conclusion of voluntary 
underemployment, Husband's employment capacity and 
earning potential are necessary elements of that analysis. 
Given the inadequacy of the trial court's findings on these 
elements, we are unable to review the merits of the trial 
court's decision to impute income to Husband. \Ve therefore 
reverse and remand for the entry of adequately detailed 
findings on the relevant factors and for such recalculations or 
redetenninations as may then be in order. 
II. Dissipation 
,i 16 Husband next challenges the sufficiency oftbe evidence 
supporting the trial court's finding that Husband dissipated 
marital assets. In the alternative, he argues that, at most, the 
evidence supports only a finding that he spent $29,364 of 
the marital assets on non-family expenses and investmems. 
Husband also argues that the trial court abused its discretion 
by not making adequate findings and by misapplying tbe law 
on the issue of dissipation. 
[14) ,i 17 Wife counters that Husband did not preserve 
a challenge to the trial court's ruling on dissipation. " [I)n 
order to preserve an issue for appeal [,) the issue must be 
presented to the trial court in such a way that the trial court 
has an opportunity to rule on that issue." 438 Main Sr. v. 
Easy Heat, Inc., 2004 UT 72, ,i 51 , 99 P.3d 801 (citation 
and internal quotation marks omitted). However, a challenge 
to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a trial court's 
ruling need not be preserved in civil cases. See Utah R. Civ. 
P. 52(b); In re K.F. , 2009 UT 4, ~ 60, 201 P.3d 985 (stating 
that a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence need not 
be preserved, but a challenge to the adequacy of findings 
must be). But as with Husband's challenge to the trial court's 
imputation of income, we are "prevented from effectively 
reviewing the trial court's decision" regarding dissipation 
given the inadequacy of the trial court's findings. See Allen v. 
Ciokewicz, 20 l 2 UT App I 62, ,i 42, 280 P .3d 425 ( citation 
and internal quotation marks omitted). 
,i 18 Following the loss of Husband's job, Husband liquidated 
$289,909 from stock and retirement accounts during 2008, 
2009, and 2010. Tbe trial court found that Husband "spent 
-- ---·--·--- - - ---····- ------ ----------------- -----
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a lot of money on himself, on trips, on entertainment[,) on 
doing things that were not by way of family expenses." The 
trial *462 court determined that it was "reasonable ... to 
just assume that it took $88,047"-Husband's average annual 
salary for the five years before be lost his job-to meet 
the family's expenses. The trial court calculated the shortfall 
between the asswned family expenses and Husband's income 
(for 2008) or imputed income (for 2009 and 20 l 0). lt then 
took the difference between the amount Husband liquidated 
each year and the shortfall for that year. The trial court 
concluded that any liquidated marital assets used to meet the 
shortfall between actual or imputed income and the assumed 
fami ly expenses were spent on legitimate family expenses. 
But the trial court concluded without further explanation that 
any liquidated assets exceeding the shortfall were dissipated. 
The trial court's final calculation of the dissipated assets 
was $ ) J 6,096. The court then gave Wife a credit for half 
of this amount in distributing the marital property. After 
factoring that credit into Wife's share of the remaining marital 
property, the trial court awarded Wife the marital borne, 
all of Husband's tax shelter annuity plan, half of Husband's 
retirement account, and a judgment against Husband for 
$12,343. We now tum to the law governing dissipation. 
money was spent, including whether funds were used to pay 
legitimate marital expenses or individual expenses, Parker, 
2000 UT App 30, ~~ 13, l 5, 996 P.2d 565; Thomas, l 999 
UT App 239, ~ 20, 987 P.2d 603; Shepherd v. Shepherd, 876 
P.2d 429, 433 (Utah Ct.App. 1994); Andersen v. Andersen, 
757 P.2d 476,480 (Utah Ct.App.1988); the parties' historical 
practices, Thomas, 1999 UT App 239, ii 20,987 P.2d 603; the 
magnitude of any depletion, Shepherd, 876 P.2d at 433; the 
timing of the challenged actions in relation to the separation 
and divorce, id.; and any obstructive efforts that hinder the 
valuation of the assets, Goggin, 2013 UT 16, ~~ 49, 53, 299 
P.3d 1079; Andrus v. Andrus, 2007 UT App 291, ~ 13, 169 
P.3d 754. After an "initial showing of apparent dissipation" 
by one party, the burden shifts to the other party " to show 
that the funds were not dissipated, but were used for some 
legitimate marital purpose." Parker, 2000 UT App 30, ~,j 13, 
15,996 P.2d 565. 
[19] [20] ~ 20 When a court finds that a spouse has 
dissipated marital assets, the court should determine the 
amount of dissipated assets and calculate the value of the 
marital property as though the assets remained. Goggin, 2013 
UT 16, ~~ 49, 53,299 P.3d l 079. "As a result, when the court 
conducts its equi table distribution of the marital property, 
(15] [16] [17] [18] ~ 19 "Section 30-3-5(1) of tbahe other spouse should receive a credit for his or her share 
Utah Code permits courts to issue ' equitable orders' relating 
to marital property in divorce cases." Goggin v. Goggin, 
2013 UT 16, ~ 47, 299 P.3d 1079. Generally, each party 
is p resumed to be entitled to half of the marital property. 
Id. This presumption may be overcome in "exceptional 
circumstances." Id. ~ 48 ( citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted). "Further, ' the marital estate is [generally] valued at 
the time of the divorce decree or trial.'" Id.~ 49 (alteration in 
original) ( quoting Jacobsen v. Jacobsen, 201 I UT App l 6 I, ii 
39,257 P.3d 478). However, a trial court has broad discretion 
to deviate from this general rule when circumstances warrant: 
"[W]here one party has dissipated an asset, hidden its value 
or otherwise acted obstructively, the trial court may, in 
the exercise of its equitable powers, value a marital asset 
at some time other than the time the decree is entered, 
such as at separation," "or may otherwise hold one party 
accountable to the other for the dissipation of marital 
assets." 
Id. (quoting Parker v. Parker, 2000 UT App 30, ~ 13, 996 
P .2d 565; Thomas v. Thomas, l 999 UT App 239, ~ 19, 987 
P.2d 603). Utah case law suggests a number of factors that 
may be relevant to determining whether a party sbouJd be 
held accountable for the dissipation of marital assets: bow the 
----··--·---··· ----· 
of the assets that were dissipated." Id. il 49. But "when a 
spouse's behavior prevents the court from determining the 
precise amount of dissipated assets, the court should estimate, 
to the best of its ability, the upper limit of the amount of assets 
that the spouse may have dissipated." id.~ 53. 
~ 21 Because the principle of dissipation represents a 
deviation from the general rule, *463 its use "must be 
supported by sufficiently detailed findings of fact that explain 
the trial court's basis for such deviation." Rappleye v. 
Rappleye, 855 P .2d 260, 262-63 (Utah C t. App.1993); accord 
Jacobsen v. Jacobsen, 201 1 UT App 16 1, ~ 39,257 P.3d478; 
see Andersen, 757 P .2d at 479-80 (remanding for additional 
findings on the issue of dissipation); Peck v. Peck, 738 P .2d 
1050, 1051- 52 (Utah Ct.App.1987) (same). 
~ 22 Here, the trial court's findings are inadequate to explain 
its deviation from the general rules governing the valuation 
of marital property. The parties did not dispute that the assets 
were liquidated and spent. But the evidence addressing the 
use of the liquidated assets was disputed, and subsidiary 
findings cannot be reasonably implied. See Hall v. Hall, 858 
P .2d IO 18, 1025 (Utah Ct.App.1993). The trial court did not 
explain why it concluded that the liquidation and spending 
- - -----------~-- ----------·-----
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of the assets qualified as diss ipation. The trial court stated 
only that Husband bad "spent a lot of money on himself, 
on trips, on entertainment[,] on doing things that were not 
by way of family expenses." This finding does not provide 
"sufficiently detailed" support for the trial court's conclusion. 
See Rappleye, 855 P.2d at 262-63. Furtbem10re, rather than 
calculating the amount of assets actua lly dissipated, the trial 
court based its valuation on an assumption of legitimate 
family expenses. A trial court may "estimate, to the best 
of its ability, the upper limit of the amount of assets that 
the spouse may have dissipated." Goggin, 2013 UT 16, ,i 
49, 299 P.3d l 079. But such an approach is appropriate 
only "when a spouse's behavior prevents the court from 
detem1ining the precise amount of dissipated assets." Id. ,i 
53; see also Andrus, 2007 UT App 29 I , ii 13, I 69 P.3d 754. 
The trial court did not enter any findings suggesting that 
Husband's behavior in any way prevented it from determining 
the precise amount of dissipated assets. 5 In fact, as the trial 
court acknowledged, extensive testimony and exhibits were 
presented regarding how the liquidated funds were spent. The 
tria l court stated, "There were many documents filed and 
statement[s] as to what income and expenses were. There 
was much that would have taken a forensic accountant to 
analyze." When insufficient evidence is presented to the court 
to support a finding of dissipation, the general rules governing 
the valuation of marital property apply. See Parker, 2000 UT 
App 30, ,i~ 13, 15, 996 P.2d 565 (explaining the burdens of 
production and persuasion attending a claim of dissipation). 
However, if sufficient evidence is presented to the court to 
support a finding of dissipation, the trial court must explain 
Footnotes 
any deviation from the general rule with "sufficiently detailed 
findings." See Rappleye, 855 P.2d at 262-63. 
i! 23 We therefore reverse and remand for the trial coun 
to enter more detailed findings determining whether the 
liquidated assets were in fact dissipated and what the precise 
amount of any dissipated assets was or why the amount of any 
dissipated assets must be estimated. We also direct the trial 
court to enter any recalculations and redetern1inations as may 
then be in order, such as an updated division of the marital 
estate, including redivision of the marital home, Husband's 
annuity plan, and Husband's retirement account. 
CONCLUSION 
,i 24 Because the trial court's findings are inadequate, we 
are unable to effectively review the trial court's decision to 
impute $40,000 in annual income to Husband for purposes 
of calculating alimony and to include S 116,096 as dissipated 
assets in its valuation of the marital property. "Accordingly, 
we remand for more detailed findings without restriction 
to any corrections or modifications the trial court deems 
appropriate." See Baum v. Hayes, 2008 UT App 371 , ,i 16, 
196 P.3d 612. 
All Citations 
316 P.3d 455, 750 Utah Adv. Rep. 55,2013 UT App 269 
1 We acknowledge, as Wife notes on appeal, that the trial court did not use the term "dissipate" in its ruling. However, the 
meaning of the trial court's ruling is clear. 
2 
3 
"Although this section of the Utah Code addresses imputation for the purposes of child support, it is also relevant to 
imputation in the a limony context." Fish v. Fish, 2010 UT App 292, 1114 n. 5, 242 P.3d 787. 
See Act of Feb. 7, 2008, ch. 3, § 1245, 2008 Utah Laws 48, 541--42; Act of July 1, 2007, ch. 354, § 4, 2007 Utah Laws 
2146, 2149. 
4 While the current statute no longer refers explicitly to a finding of voluntary unemployment or underemployment, Connell 
v. Conne/1, 2010 UT App 139, 1116 n. 4,233 P.3d 836, we conclude that voluntary unemployment and underemployment 
remain relevant. see Busche v. Busche, 2012 UT App 16, 11 16, 272 P .3d 7 48 (" Imputation is used when the obligor is 
believed to be concealing income or to be shirking in his efforts to earn income." (quoting American Law Inst. , Principles 
of the Law of Family Dissolution: Analysis and Recommendations§ 3.14(5) cmt. e(i) (2002))); Fish v. Fish, 2010 UT App 
292, 111114-17, 242 P.3d 787 (upholding a trial court's finding of underemployment under the current statute); Griffith v. 
Griffith, 959 P.2d 1015, 1018 (Utah Ct.App.1998) ("[T)he goal of imputing income is to prevent parents from reducing 
their child support or alimony by purposeful unemployment or underemployment." (emphasis added)), affd, 1999 UT 
78, 985 P.2d 255. 
5 We note that Goggin v. Goggin, 2013 UT 16, 299 P.3d 1079, was issued after the trial court had ruled in the present 
case, and thus the trial court did not have the benefit of this guidance when it entered its findings. 
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CREDITOR LISTING 
Tanya Rodgers Rayner v. Paul T. Ravner 
Case No. 10-470-1766 
CREDITOR'S NAME CONSIDERATION PMT 
DUE 
GMAC Is, Mortgage (was 
paid by wife's family) 
GMAC 2nd Mortgage 
Bank of America Credit Card - Visa I 61h 
(Collections) 
Bank of America Credil Card - Master 16ll, 
Card (Collections) 
Deseret First Credit Credit Card 25ll, 
Union 
Deseret First Credit Overdraft 25'h 
Union 
Horizon Credit Union Spouse's Account 201h 
(estimate) 
Citi Bank/Sallie Mae School Loan for 10th 
daughter 
Internal Revenue Service Tax Liability 20 l 0 
Utah State Tax Tax Liability- 20 10 
Commission 
TOTAL 
BALANCE 
$155,157.00 
$47,750.00 
$8,483.00 
$9,060.00 
$1,566. 17 
$1 1,744.25 
$2,000.00 
$14,13 1.85 
$7,949.24 
$3,425.07 
$261,266.58 
PMT 
AMT 
$2,043.84 
$583.84 
$280.00 
$260.00 
$100.00 
$360.00 
$100.00 
$200.00 
$200.00 
$150.00 
$4,277.68 
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